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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  On January 3, 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted unanimously to 
close its nearly two-year antitrust investigation into Google’s search practices without 
filing a complaint.
1
  Though the FTC did secure a consent decree involving patent 
licensing in Google’s mobile business,2 it concluded that the firm’s practice of often 
favoring its own content in the presentation of search results, sometimes referred to as 
search “bias,”3 did not violate U.S. antitrust law.4  It determined that, though the practice 
may have an incidental negative impact on some competitors, it was a quality 
improvement that likely benefited consumers.
5
  Similarly, it concluded that Google did 
not selectively change its search algorithm to exclude competitors and impede 
competition, and that any disadvantage to competing websites was the collateral result of 
changes that likely improved the quality of Google’s search results.6  
 
1
 See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of 
Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163, Jan. 3, 2013, 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf [hereinafter FTC Statement Regarding 
Google’s Search Practices].   
2
 See FTC Release, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition 
Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search, Jan. 3, 
2013, http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm [hereinafter FTC Release] (summarizing the terms of 
Google’s agreement under a Consent Order not to “seek injunctions to block rivals from using patents 
essential to key technologies”). 
3
 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some Preliminary Evidence 3 
(George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-14, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004649 (defining “search bias” for antitrust purposes in terms of the “differences 
in organic rankings attributable to the search engine ranking its own content [‘own-content bias’]”).  See 
generally Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle 1 (Univ. of Mich. Public Law 
Working Paper No. 256, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961742 (commenting that “bias” and 
“discrimination,” terms apparently used to describe search engines “prefer[ring] their own content on 
adjacent websites in search results,” are slippery terms and expressing skepticism of the “search neutrality” 
principle). 
4
 The FTC did obtain two voluntary concessions from Google relating to its search business: (1) Google 
will allow websites to opt out of display on Google’s vertical properties but remain in its organic search 
results, and (2) it will remove certain restrictions on the use of its search ad platform, AdWords, that might 
hamper advertisers’ management of their ad campaigns across multiple platforms.  Commitment Letter 
from David Drummond, Google Inc., to Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the FTC (Dec. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf [hereinafter Google’s 
Commitment Letter].  
5
 FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1, at 2 (“Notably, the documents, 
testimony and quantitative evidence the Commission examined are largely consistent with the conclusion 
that Google likely benefited consumers by prominently displaying its vertical content on its search results 
page.”). 
6
 See id. at 3 (“Similarly, we have not found sufficient evidence that Google manipulates its search 
algorithms to unfairly disadvantage vertical websites that compete with Google-owned vertical properties.  
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¶2  In terminating the investigation after concluding that Google had not made changes 
to its search results in order to “exclude actual or potential competitors and inhibit the 
competitive process,”7 the FTC seemed to have implicitly rejected the notion that a major 
search engine may not favor its proprietary content in search results unless that content is 
“objectively” superior to competing content.  While some Google critics, particularly its 
competitors, disapproved of the outcome,
8
 the FTC’s decision is well-grounded.  If 
Google did not act to impede competition, then it is difficult to identify an antitrust theory 
of liability for its search practices, even if they incidentally disadvantaged a competitor.  
¶3  Seeking the competitive advantages inherent in vertical integration—which is what 
preferential treatment of one’s own property in search results is about—is usually not 
unlawful under antitrust law.
9
  The core issue that I will address in this article is whether 
the antitrust duty to deal and the essential facilities doctrine, nevertheless, provide an 
antitrust basis for prohibiting this practice, as some have suggested.  I conclude that they 
do not.
10
  Apart from the Supreme Court’s recently expressed strong disfavor of both 
principles in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
11
 
there are other serious obstacles to the possible use of either principle to mandate 
“neutral” search rankings. 
¶4  A threshold issue is monopoly power.  Notwithstanding Google’s absolute size and 
acknowledged success, it is unlikely that Google has monopoly power in an antitrust 
sense.  In a dynamic environment where users are increasingly turning to other Internet 
portals for information, it is inconsistent with market reality to view general search 
engines as completely distinct from other online information businesses vying for user 
attention and advertising dollars.
12
  Moreover, regardless of how narrowly the relevant 
market is defined, monopoly power cannot be inferred from high market shares because 
 
Although at points in time various vertical websites have experienced demotions, we find that this was a 
consequence of algorithm changes that also could plausibly be viewed as an improvement in the overall 
quality of Google’s search results.”). 
7
 Id. at 2. 
8
 See, e.g., FairSearch: FTC Statement Not the Last Word, Premature, FAIRSEARCH.ORG (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.fairsearch.org/general/fairsearch-ftc-settlement-not-the-last-word-premature/ (criticizing the 
FTC’s decision as “disappointing and premature”); ICOMP, Statement on “Deeply Disappointing” FTC 
Google Decision, London (Jan. 3, 2013), http://newsroom.i-comp.org/statement-on-ftc-google-decision/.  
FairSearch.org is an alliance of Google’s competitors.  See About FairSearch.org, 
http://www.fairsearch.org/about-fairsearch/ (last visited April 12, 2013) (listing the members of the 
organization, including Microsoft). 
9
 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (“So long as we 
allow a firm to compete in several fields, we must expect it to seek the competitive advantages of its broad-
based activity—more efficient production, greater ability to develop complementary products, reduced 
transaction costs, and so forth.  These are gains that accrue to any integrated firm, regardless of its market 
share, and they cannot by themselves be considered uses of monopoly power.”); Olympia Equip. Leasing 
Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 373, 375–76 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the sole provider of 
telex services did not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act when it told its sales staff to stop showing a list 
of outside vendors to its subscribers and adjusted its commissions to encourage them to sell more of the 
firm’s own terminals). 
10
 From the FTC’s focus on the primary purpose of Google’s algorithm and design changes—which it 
determined to be product improvement rather than the exclusion of competition—and not on Google’s 
“duties” toward its competitors due to its dominance as a search engine, it appears that the FTC ultimately 
did not view the “duty to deal” as a viable theory of antitrust liability.  See generally FTC Statement 
Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1. 
11
 540 U.S. 398, 407–11, 415 (2004).  
12
 See infra Part III-B-1. 
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of the unusual competitive constraints confronting Google.
13
  Users can switch from one 
search engine to another in an instant and, because of the nature of the product (search 
results), competing search engines have the ability to quickly meet any increase in user 
demand.  
¶5  In addition to the market power issue, there are other critical problems with the 
potential application of either doctrine in the context of search.  For the essential facilities 
doctrine,
14
 the requirements for its application to search results are unlikely to be 
satisfied.
15
  Even accepting the implicit assumption of those making an essential facility 
case that the results listing is the alleged essential facility, no Google rival has been 
“denied access”—quality competitor websites are still highly ranked for certain 
keywords, though perhaps not for others.  Moreover, the law is clear that there is no 
obligation to share even an essential facility, if a resource is not sharable.  Because the 
first-ranked position is obviously non-sharable, it is practically impossible to make a case 
for the application of the essential facilities doctrine to search rankings. 
¶6  The general duty to deal presents another set of problems.  It is difficult to see how 
Google taking the top spot for itself in the results page would meet the strict conditions 
that might trigger a duty to deal set forth in Trinko.
16
  There was no profitable preexisting 
business relationship that was “terminated,” causing a short-term loss of profits for 
Google when Google Maps, for example, “displaced” Mapquest in the top rank.17 
¶7  Mandated assistance for a rival, the remedy for liability under either essential 
facilities or the duty to deal doctrine, poses another generally unexamined problem.  
Mandatory cooperation has never meant free access or assistance.
18
  How would 
mandatory access work when a search engine’s business model does not accept payment 
from a website for inclusion in its rank-ordered organic results?  These are only a few of 
the incongruities with both antitrust principles in the search context. 
¶8  Furthermore, neither essential facilities nor the duty to deal principle would apply if 
the incidental adverse effects of the search practices at issue are outweighed by the 
procompetitive benefits,
19
 or if there are legitimate business justifications for them.
20
  The 
many user benefits of integrating a search engine’s proprietary content in its search 
results—such as incorporating a map, rather than linking to another website requiring yet 
 
13
 See infra Part III-B-2. 
14
 In general terms, to successfully invoke the essential facilities doctrine, a plaintiff must show that (1) 
a monopolist controls access to an essential facility (2) a competitor cannot reasonably duplicate the facility 
(3) the monopolist has denied access of the facility to a competitor, and (4) it is feasible for the monopolist 
to share access.  MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983); see infra Part 
III. 
15
 See infra Part III-C. 
16
 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (suggesting that the duty to deal is limited to situations where the monopolist 
terminated a preexisting profitable relationship with a competitor, which entailed a sacrifice of short-term 
profits for the monopolist).  See infra Part IV-A.   
17
 See infra Part IV. 
18
 See infra Part V. 
19
 Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (articulating the factors to be considered 
under the rule of reason).  See infra Part VI. 
20
 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604–05, 608–10 (1985) 
(suggesting that the refusal would not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act had there been non-pretextual 
business reasons for the refusal); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 
n.32 (1992) (observing that a monopolist may refuse to deal with its rivals “if there are legitimate 
competitive reasons for the refusal”). 
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another query—are widely acknowledged.21  The practice is embraced not only by 
Google but also by other competing search engines with no ability to exercise market 
power, suggesting that it is a competitive strategy. 
¶9  In addition to the doctrinal misfit of the “refusal to deal” rubric, the wisdom of 
prohibiting search engines from favoring their own content in search results (sometimes 
termed implementing search “neutrality”) is questionable as a matter of policy.  Imposing 
search neutrality would likely jeopardize the search engine evolution and distort 
competition in the broad online information market.
22
  The concept of search neutrality is 
based on the “ten blue links” origin of search engines, where search and content occupied 
distinct spaces.  If a search engine is restricted to its original contours and may only 
include a map with its search results, for example, after applying a neutral standard to 
select the map to be displayed—Google, Mapquest, or Bing—it is probable that no map 
would be included.  It is difficult to see how this would benefit users. 
¶10  This is not to suggest that search rankings can never give rise to an antitrust 
violation.  There is a distinction between a simple preference for one’s own products and 
services, which is not and should not be unlawful, and unjustified acts to obstruct 
competition, which would be problematic.
23
  But absent affirmative exclusionary acts, 
government or judicial intervention to impose neutrality, no matter how well-intentioned, 
could impede innovation, distort competition, and, ironically, undermine the core purpose 
of the antitrust laws. 
¶11  This paper begins, in Part II, with a brief overview of search engines, their 
preference for their own content in unpaid search rankings, and the general antitrust 
narrative.  Part III examines the historically narrowly construed essential facilities 
doctrine, including the question of market definition and market power, and the thorny 
concepts of essentiality, denial of access, and “nonrivalrousness.”  Part IV discusses 
unilateral refusals to deal (not involving an essential facility), focusing on the sacrifice-
of-profits limitation.  Part V explores the compensation conundrum relating to the 
essential facilities doctrine and the general duty to deal in the search context.  Part VI 
questions the often-embedded assumption that preference for one’s own property, framed 
in terms of denial of access or refusal to deal, is necessarily anticompetitive.  It further 
suggests that the practice is likely a legitimate competitive strategy.  Part VII raises 
policy issues, focusing on the risk that imposing search “neutrality” will freeze the search 
engine evolution and distort competition in the broader Internet information market. 
II. SEARCH ENGINES, PREFERENCE FOR OWN CONTENT, AND THE ANTITRUST NARRATIVE 
¶12  Search engines play an important role in making the Internet accessible and 
useful.
24





 The FTC apparently acknowledges these benefits.  See FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search 
Practices, supra note 1 (“While Google’s prominent display of its own vertical search results on its search 
results page had the effect in some cases of pushing other results ‘below the fold,’ the evidence suggests 
that Google’s primary goal in introducing this content was to quickly answer, and better satisfy, its users’ 
search queries by providing directly relevant information.”). 
22
 See infra Part VII-B. 
23
 See infra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. 
24
 See Press Release, comScore Releases July 2011 U.S. Search Engine Rankings, COMSCORE (Aug. 10, 
2011), 
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presenting what is relevant in response to search queries, search engines help users locate 
information on the Internet on practically any topic no matter how obscure.
26
  And in so 
doing, they also help content providers connect with their audience.  From a commercial 
perspective, search engines provide an efficient means for consumers to find businesses 
that best serve their needs and for businesses to reach consumers.
27
  By reducing search 
costs, information costs, and transaction costs in ways unimaginable little more than a 
decade ago, search engines greatly facilitate voluntary transactions.  But they are 
certainly not indispensable either for users searching for information or for businesses 
reaching potential customers in the digital world, especially in the last few years when 
social networks, such as Facebook, and powerful specialized sites, such as Amazon, have 
transformed the way many users seek information.
28
 
¶13  The technology behind the operation of search engines is complex and 
sophisticated.
29
  Search engines continually search, index, and store (or cache) Internet 
content on their servers.
30
  When a user enters a query, the search engine searches its 
index and cached content and generates two types of results: “organic” (or unpaid) 
results, and sponsored (or paid) links.
31
  The organic results traditionally consisted of 
rank-ordered links to webpages containing information the search engine deems most 
responsive to the search query
32—the so-called ten blue links—though they have evolved 
beyond that,
33
 as I will discuss below.  Content providers do not have to pay a search 





ch_Engine_Rankings (reporting that in July 2011, over 17.1 billion search queries were conducted in the 
United States). 
25
 Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj, We Knew the Web Was Big . . . , THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (July 25, 
2008, 1:12 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html (estimating that there 
were, in 2008, more than one trillion webpages on the Internet and that more were appearing every day). 
26
 One could, as one commentator said, search “mongolian gerbils” on Google and locate authoritative 
information on the subject on the Internet—information that one unfamiliar with the subject would have 
difficulty finding without a search engine.  See James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 939, 940 (2009) [hereinafter Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma]. 
27
 See Press Release, 2010 Social Shopping Study Reveals Changes in Consumers’ Online Shopping 
Habits and Usage of Customer Reviews, THE E-TAILING GROUP (May 3, 2010), http://www.e-
tailing.com/content/?p=1193  (reporting that 57% of consumers used a search engine to shop online). 
28
 See infra notes 117–26, 152–65 and accompanying text. 
29
 For good descriptions of the technology behind the operation of search engines, see Eric Goldman, 
Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 532–51 (2005) [hereinafter 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy] (describing how search engines search the Internet and return ranked 
results); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2007) 
[hereinafter Grimmelmann, Search Engine Law] (providing an overview of how search engines work).  
30
 See, e.g., Nancy Blachman & Jerry Peek, How Google Works, GOOGLEGUIDE (Feb. 2, 2007), 
http://www.googleguide.com/google_works.html.  It is said that Google utilizes over 450,000 servers, and 
that its major competitors (Bing and Yahoo!) have comparable infrastructure support.  See Grimmelmann, 
The Google Dilemma, supra note 26, at 942. 
31
 See, e.g., Nancy Blachman & Jerry Peek, Results Page, GOOGLEGUIDE (Feb. 2, 2007),  
http://www.googleguide.com/results_page.html. 
32
 See Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note 29, at 534–42 (describing the complex process by 
which search engines sort, rank, and return organic results in response to a query). 
33
 See James Niccolai, Yahoo Vows Death to the ‘10 Blue Links,’ PCWORLD (May 19, 2009, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/165214/yahoo_vows_death_to_blue_links.html (previewing Yahoo!’s 
“better alternative to the traditional‘10 blue links’”); Theo Vachovsky, “I Don’t Need Ten Blue Links—Just 
Give Me the Answer!,” BING SEARCH BLOG (Oct. 29, 2008, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.bing.com/community/site_blogs/b/search/archive/2008/10/29/i-don-t-need-ten-blue-links-just-
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¶14   “Sponsored links,” the source of most of a search engine’s revenues,35 are often 
search-based advertisements that are returned (and clearly identified as such) in the 
search results, along with the organic results.
36
  Advertisers bid to win auctions for 
specific keywords, which would then lead to the placement of their links on the results 
pages for queries that include the keyword.
37
  Because advertising space is limited, and 
pricing is based on the number of clicks on the sponsored link, all search engines apply a 
quality metric that effectively requires advertisers to bid higher per click the less relevant 
their link is to the search term (that is, the fewer the predicted number of clicks).
38
  This 
has led to complaints against Google from some potential advertisers whose low scores 
effectively priced them out, or whose poor quality sites excluded them from bidding.
39
  
The issues raised by these allegations are distinct from those stemming from search 
engines’ favoring their own content in the organic results and will not be discussed in this 
article. 
 
give-me-the-answer.aspx; Facts about Google and Competition Better Answers, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/competition/betteranswers.html (last visited June 21, 2011) (“Sometimes the best, 
most relevant answer is a list of websites—our traditional ‘ten blue links.’  Other times the best answer 
might be a news article, sports score, stock quote, video, comparison shopping results, or a map.”).  See 
also infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
34
 Nancy Blachman & Jerry Peek, Ads, GOOGLEGUIDE (Aug. 24, 2008), 
http://googleguide.com/ads.html (“Google never sells its search results.”). 
35
 See KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 16 (2009) (quoting former 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt saying, “We are in the advertising business”); VIRGINIA SCOTT, GOOGLE 
(CORPORATIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD) 76 (2008).  As virtually everyone knows, users do not have 
to pay to conduct searches or use other features of a search engine; content providers are also not charged, 
even if their inclusion in the organic results leads to revenue-producing transactions.  See, e.g., The Power 
of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, 
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 35-3620001 
(2011) [hereinafter Hearing on the Power of Google] (statement of Susan A. Creighton, Partner, Wilson, 
Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg71471/pdf/CHRG-112shrg71471.pdf (summarizing Google’s success in innovating while keeping 
its services free to users and also “provide[ing] free ‘promotion’ to high quality sites, including Google 
competitors, through the operation of its natural search functions).  
36
 See Blachman & Peek, supra note 31. 
37
 For discussions of search-based advertising, including its mechanics and pricing, see Grimmelmann, 
Search Engine Law, supra note 29, at 11–13; Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the 
Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 
193–94, 203–06 (2011) [hereinafter Manne & Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust]. 
38
 See Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What’s the 
Question?, 16–17 (ICLE Antitrust & Consumer Protection Program White Paper Series, Lewis & Clark 
Law School Studies Research Paper No. 2011–14, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1807951 
[hereinafter Manne & Wright, If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What’s the Question] (explaining why the 
“click through” pricing system necessitates a relative weighting system, where a potential advertiser must 
bid higher per click the less relevant, and of poorer quality, its link is to the keyword). 
39
 See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  TradeComet 
operates SourceTool, a website that focuses on businesses—a business-to-business directory that primarily 
lists product and service suppliers for businesses.  TradeComet’s complaint alleged that Google’s 
implementation of a quality metric raised the amount it must pay Google per click causing it to fail to win a 
favorable advertisement placement on Google.  This allegedly precluded SourceTool from gaining user 
traffic and attracting search advertisers in competition with Google.  See Manne & Wright, If Search 
Neutrality is the Answer, What’s the Question, supra note 38, at 43–44.  The complaint was dismissed on a 
Rule 12(b) motion based on a forum selection clause that TradeComet accepted when it participated in 
Google’s search advertising platform.  693 F. Supp. 2d at 373. 
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A. The “Ten Blue Links” and Beyond 
¶15  Returning to the subject of the unpaid organic search results, search engines rely 
primarily on complex proprietary algorithms to assess the relative value of countless 
webpages,
40
 though manual adjustments are occasionally made, usually to target web 
spam.
41
  The algorithms take into account numerous factors designed to determine the 
relevance and quality of the web content so that links can be returned in the order 
perceived to be most useful to the searcher.
42
  Each search provider’s algorithm, 
protected as a trade secret,
43
 reflects its judgment as to what makes content responsive 
and valuable.
44
  Because search engines attract advertisers by drawing users, and users 
like relevant results, search providers frequently update their algorithms and sometimes 
make manual tweaks to improve the results and to prevent spammers and scammers from 
“gaming” the algorithm.45 
¶16  Until about 2005, the lines between web content and search were clear.  The role of 
general search engines, which did not create web content or provide other services, was 
simply to generate a list of the most useful websites for the user—the “ten blue links”—
in response to a search query.  All three major search engines have since redesigned their 
products and evolved into integrated information portals.  Among the changes is a 
movement away from the traditional ten blue links to the incorporation of, or interface 
with, the search engine’s specialized search results.46  This sometimes includes providing 
 
40
 See Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, supra note 26, at 941–42 (explaining generally how 
Google’s search algorithm assesses the relative relevance of a website’s content to a user’s query). 
41
 See James Grimmelmann, Google Replies to SearchKing Lawsuit, LAW MEME @ YALE LAW SCHOOL, 
http://lawmeme.research.yale.edu/modules.php%C2?name=News&file=article&sid=807 (analyzing 
Google’s answer to a lawsuit by SearchKing—thought by many to be operating a “link farm”—as a non-
denial of SearchKing’s claim that Google had hand-tweaked the results to demote SearchKing’s link). 
42
 In the case of Google, PageRank, the proprietary algorithm that it uses to assess relevance and rank 
results, is said to incorporate over 200 variously weighted criteria selected by Google and is changed about 
500 times a year.  See James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT 
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435, 455 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1742444 [hereinafter 
Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality]; see also Udi Manber, Introduction to Google 
Search Quality, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (May 20, 2008, 9:20 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/introduction-to-google-search-quality.html (describing how 
PageRank is now supplemented by other parts of the search system including “language models,” “query 
models,” “time models,” and “personalized models”); Manne & Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, 
What’s the Question?, supra note 38, at 15 (“These search algorithms generally parse out the content of the 
websites themselves to best answer a user’s inquiry.  They then attempt to ascertain the context and nature 
of the user’s question in order to determine what factors—such as date, age of source, credible websites 
linking to the site in question, and so on—should sort the relevant results.”). 
43
 See Manber, Introduction to Google Search Quality, supra note 42 (“There are two reasons [for 
maintaining Google’s secrecy]: competition and abuse.  Competition is pretty straightforward.  No 
company wants to share its secret recipes with its competitors.  As for abuse, if we make our ranking 
formulas too accessible, we make it easier for people to game the system.”). 
44
 See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 188 (2006) (explaining that the choice of which factors to include in the algorithms and how to 
weigh each factor reflects the search engine’s editorial judgments about what content is valuable); Tom 
Zeller, Jr., Gaming the Search Engine in a Political Season, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/06/business/media/06link.html (“Each engine has a slightly different 
magic formula for indexing the incomprehensibly huge universe of Web pages out there.”). 
45
 See Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, supra note 42, at 455 (stating that 
Google makes about 500 changes a year to its algorithm). 
46
 See supra note 33; see also The Evolution of Search in Six Minutes, GOOGLE BLOG (Nov. 28, 2011, 
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a direct answer at the top of the organic results listing (the “OneBox” result),47 
integrating the search engine’s maps, images, videos, or information on places and 
products into the search results (“universal” or “blended” results), or linking to a search 
engine’s affiliated websites.48  The usual explanation for this change is that it is an 
improvement to the search experience desired by users.
49
 
¶17  It is the blurring of the lines between content/service and searches that has 
generated the main antitrust criticism against Google: that it is allegedly foreclosing 
competition in vertical markets by featuring its own content more prominently in search 
results.
50
  Though these changes are occurring at all three major general search engines—
Google, Bing and Yahoo!
51—Google has been the focus of the debate because it is the 
dominant search engine. 
 
10:41 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/evolution-of-search-in-six-minutes.html. 
47
  See, e.g., Height of Statue of Liberty, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=height%20of%20statue%20of%20liberty (last visited April 13, 2013) 
(responding to a “height of statue of liberty” Google search query by providing its direct answer first in the 
results, followed by other traditional outbound links to relevant webpages such as Wikipedia and the 
National Park Service). 
48
 An October 2010 study showed that one-third of all searches on the three major search engines, 
Google, Bing, and Yahoo!, produced “blended” results—including a search engine’s own non-web sources 
such as news, videos, or images.  Interestingly, Bing included these blended results at a higher rate than 
Google (54% for Bing and 33% for Google).  Eli Goodman & Eli Feldblum, Blended Search and the New 




 See Niccolai, supra note 33 (quoting a Yahoo! executive who noted that “[p]eople don’t really want to 
search . . . .  [t]heir objective is to quickly uncover the information they are looking for, not to scroll 
through a list of links to Web pages.”). 
50
 See, e.g., FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1 (“Some vertical websites 
alleged that Google unfairly promoted its own vertical properties through changes in its search results page, 
such as the introduction of the “Universal Search” box, which prominently displayed Google vertical 
search results in response to certain types of queries, including shopping and local.”); Thomas Barnett, Op-
Ed., Google’s Search Tactics Warrant Antitrust Scrutiny: Tom Barnett, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2011 12:20 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-16/google-s-search-tactics-warrant-antitrust-scrutiny-tom-
barnett.html; Tom Cheredar, Yelp Cooperating with FTC on Antitrust Suit Against Google, VENTUREBEAT 
(Sept. 21, 2011, 7:40 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/09/21/yelp-joins-antitrust-lawsuit-against-
google.html; Bianca Bosker, In Antitrust Battle Against Google, Smaller Rivals Say Web Giant is ‘Trying 
to Kill Them,’ HUFFINGTONPOST (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/google-
antitrust-battle-smaller-rivals_n_972062.html (reporting that at the center of the federal antitrust 
investigation into Google are allegations concerning “the company’s use of its dominant position as a 
search engine to steer users to Google-owned sites”); Thomas Cantan & Amir Efrati, Feds to Launch Probe 
of Google, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576403603764717680.html (noting that 
Expedia, Kayak.com, TripAdvisor, WebMD.com, Yelp.com, Citysearch.com, and Sabre Holders have all 
made these complaints against Google); Greg Sterling, EU Antitrust Complaints Against Google Grow to 
Nine, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Aug. 2, 2011, 7:44 PM), http://searchengineland.com/eu-antitrust-
complaints-against-google-grow-to-nine-87915. 
51
 See FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1 (“[O]ther competing general 
search engines adopted many similar [universal search] changes, suggesting that these changes are a quality 
improvement with no necessary connection to the anticompetitive exclusion of rivals.”). 
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B. Favoring a Search Engine’s Specialized Search Results and the General  
Antitrust Narrative 
¶18  A grievance commonly voiced against Google is that its search results tend to point 
search users to Google’s own content and services.52  For example, if a search query 
(such as for “Starbucks”) suggests that a user would likely find a map helpful, Google 
will automatically return a Google map showing the Starbucks locations closest to the 
user along with other usual links.
53
  The same search conducted on Bing shows a similar 
result: a Bing map is returned at the top of the organic results as opposed to a Google or 
Mapquest map.
54
  These complaints are most often made by specialized websites 
(sometimes called vertical search engines) that compete with Google to varying 
degrees
55—sites that focus on discrete categories of searches, such as Kayak or Expedia 
for travel, Nextag for product and price comparison, Yelp for restaurant reviews, and 
AOL’s Mapquest for maps.56   
¶19  The essence of their grievance is that by allocating choice space on the results page 
for its own content in response to certain queries, the search engine deprives its rivals in 
ancillary markets of user traffic, thereby foreclosing them from competition in those 
markets.
57
  That is, if a Google map is top-ranked when a user searches on Google.com 
for Starbucks, the user would have little incentive to navigate to a competing map site, 
such as Mapquest or Bing, thereby making it difficult for Mapquest or Bing to compete 
with Google in providing map content.
58
  Or, if a search for “Los Angeles restaurants” 
 
52
 See, e.g., CONSUMER WATCHDOG, Traffic Report: How Google Is Squeezing Out Competitors and 
Muscling Into New Markets (June 2, 2010), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/TrafficStudy-
Google.pdf (accusing Google of abandoning neutral search by “steering Internet searchers to its own 
services”). 
53
 See Starbucks, GOOGLE, https://google.com/search?q=starbucks (last visited April 13, 2013).  
However, in a search for “map sites,” Google lists Bing maps first, followed by Mapquest second, in its 
organic results.  See Map Sites, Google, https://google.com/search?q=map%20sites (last visited April 13, 
2013). 
54
 Curiously, given the passionate concerns that have been expressed on this issue, a recent study 
showed that the absolute level of own-content bias—that is, where a search engine’s content is ranked 
higher on its own search engine than on competing search engines—was extremely low.  See Wright, 
Defining and Measuring Search Bias, supra note 3, at 50  Moreover, to the extent that bias did exist, it was 
a more frequent occurrence on the non-dominant search engine Bing than on Google, which strongly 
suggests that the practice of favoring one’s own content in search results is not a function of market power 
but is probably an efficient competitive strategy.  See id.; see also Danny Sullivan, Study: Google 
“Favors” Itself Only 19% of the Time, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Jan. 19, 2011, 5:22 PM), 
http://searchengineland.com/survey-google-favors-itself-only-19-of-the-time-61675.  
55
 See Jeffrey Katz, Google’s Monopoly and Internet Freedom, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2012 (“Google 
should provide consumers with access to the unbiased search results it was once known for—regardless of 
which company or organization owns the service.”).  Katz is the CEO of Nextag, a product comparison 
website that has complained about Google “biasing” its search results toward its own content about 
products. 
56
 See Bosker, supra note 50. 
57
 See, e.g., Hearing on the Power of Google, supra note 35, at 35–36 (statement of Jeff Katz, Chief 
Executive Officer, Nextag, Inc.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg71471/pdf/CHRG-112shrg71471.pdf (alleging that Google “rigs its results, biasing in favor of 
Google”); id. at 36–38 (statement of Jeremy Stoppelman, Cofounder and CEO, Yelp!, Inc.) (alleging that 
Google favors its own sites and “artificially promotes its own properties, regardless of merit”); Amir Efrati, 
Rivals Say Google Plays Favorites, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704058704576015630188568972.html. 
58
 See Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, But You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.html (“[Google’s] preferential placement of Google 
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produces universal search results—an integration of several business listings, maps, and 
reviews created or compiled by Google—at the very top, followed by a link to Yelp 
further down the page, presumably fewer people would navigate to Yelp’s website.59 
¶20  Some Google competitors also alleged that Google changed its search algorithms to 
specifically demote their rankings because of their competitive threat to Google in certain 
categories.  For example, Foundem, a U.K. shopping comparison site, alleged that 
Google applied algorithm penalties against its website because of its competition with 
Google in the U.K. in product searches.
60
  Google responded that its ranking algorithm 
merely reflected its view that websites with little original content, such as Foundem’s, are 
of low value to users.
61
  To support its argument, Google pointed out that the websites of 
some of its competitors (presumably with original content), such as Amazon, 
Shopping.com, and Expedia, typically rank very highly in search results.
62
 
¶21  While we do not know whether the FTC specifically examined Foundem’s 
allegations, the agency did generally conclude that Google had not selectively changed its 
algorithm to impede competition; rather, any demotions of competing websites were the 
incidental effects of changes that could be considered design improvements.
63
  Given the 
vocal and widely publicized complaints made by Foundem’s founder,64 it seems 
reasonable to assume that the FTC examined those specific allegations but found them 
wanting.
65
     
 
Maps helped it unseat MapQuest from its position as America’s leading online mapping service virtually 
overnight.”).  
59
 See Bosker, supra note 50. 
60
 See Raff, supra note 58 (asserting that Google’s “domination of the global search market and ability 
to penalize competitors while placing its own services at the top of its search results” created a “virtually 
unassailable competitive advantage” for Google). 
61
 See Emma Woollacott, Google Hits Back Against Anti-Trust Complaints, TGDAILY (Sept. 6, 2010, 
9:01 AM), http://www.tgdaily.com/business-and-law-features/51403-google-hits-back-against-anti-trust-
complaints; see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Problem of Search Engines as Essential Facilities: An 
Economic & Legal Assessment, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 
424 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747289 (explaining 
that spam sites and the like “can and do take advantage of predictable search results to occupy desirable 
search result real estate” and that often requires “a host of algorithm tweaks and even human interventions” 
to ensure the quality of the search results).  For its part, Foundem relied on two positive comments from 
third parties to argue that its website was not of low quality.  See Foundem’s Google Story, 
SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Aug. 18, 2009), http: //www.searchneutrality.org/foundem-google-story.  
SearchNeutrality.org is a Foundem-created website with all content written by its founders.  See About, 
SEARCHNEUTRALITY.ORG (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.searchneutrality.org/about. 
62
 Woollacott, supra note 61.  As any casual user of Amazon or Expedia would know, these websites, 
generally acknowledged to be of high quality, include a wealth of original content, such as user reviews on 
Amazon. 
63
 See FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1. 
64
 See James Temple, Foundem Takes on Google’s Search Methods, S.F. CHRON., June 26, 2011, at D-1, 
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/25/BUDG1K29R9.DTL; Charles 
Arthur, Foundem Accuses Google of Using Its Power to Favour its Own Links, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/nov/30/google-foundem-ec-competition-rules 
(discussing the EU investigation and Foundem’s claims).  
65
 Allegations that Google’s algorithm unfairly affected a website’s ranking have also been consistently 
rejected by courts on the grounds that search results are a search engine’s opinion protected by the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 
831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); see also Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment 
Protection for Search Engine Search Results, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 20, 2012), 
http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf (arguing that 
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¶22  If, as the FTC found, Google did not specifically demote the ranking of competitors 
to foreclose competition, then it is difficult to identify a basis for antitrust liability for its 
search practices.  Because a search engine’s ranking decisions are made unilaterally, any 
antitrust cause of action must necessarily be based on monopolization (or attempted 
monopolization) under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
66
  Mere possession of monopoly 
power is, of course, insufficient to constitute monopolization—the defendant must also 
have engaged in “exclusionary conduct” in the achievement or maintenance of that 
power.
67
  But seeking the competitive advantages that flow to a firm from integration, 
which is what the preferential treatment of one’s own products or services is about, is 
usually not considered exercise of monopoly power and is not unlawful.
68
   
¶23  Thus, embedded in any argument that Google violates antitrust law simply by 
preferring its own content is an assumption that Google has a “duty to deal” (whether or 
not involving an essential facility).  That is, it presumes that Google has a duty to return 
search results based on an “objective” or “neutral” standard and may not automatically 
display its own proprietary content more prominently.  For absent such a duty, a search 
engine’s practice of preferring its own content over competing content in the presentation 
of search results, in and of itself, could not constitute exclusionary conduct that would 
give rise to section 2 liability. 
¶24  In the following sections, I will consider the two duty to deal principles on their 
own terms and will suggest that the imposition of such a duty in the display of search 
results is incoherent.  But, preliminarily, I will briefly note that it is unclear whether 
search and content should be considered separate markets or whether search engines’ 
progression into content (and the merging of search and content) would be more aptly 
characterized as a product redesign.
69
   
¶25  The Internet information market is highly dynamic with products and services 
constantly evolving and redefining themselves.  In this environment, it may be 
 
search engine results represent each search engine’s editorial judgment of which content to include and, as 
such, are fully protected by the First Amendment). 
66
 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (declaring it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (requiring, in section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, concert of action between two or more market participants and, therefore, forclosing 
unilateral action by a firm from giving rise to an antitrust violation under that section).   
67
 The offense of monopolization is often said to require proof of the possession of monopoly power in a 
relevant market, and “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”  United States 
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).  The “willful acquisition or maintenance” language is 
generally understood to refer to improper conduct that excludes competition (or “exclusionary conduct”).  
See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 458 (2009) (noting that a section 2 
monopolization case requires a showing that “a defendant’s monopoly power rests, not upon ‘skill, 
foresight and industry,’ but upon exclusionary conduct” (citations omitted)); Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm., 522 F.3d 456, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The critical question is whether Rambus engaged in 
exclusionary conduct, and thereby acquired its monopoly power in the relevant markets unlawfully.”). 
68
 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that 
seeking the efficiencies and other advantages that accrue to any integrated firm is not considered use of 
monopoly power, regardless of the firm’s market share).  
69
 While the FTC refers to Google’s content as its “vertical properties” and frames the issue in terms of 
whether Google acted to “disadvantage vertical websites that compete with Google-owned vertical 
properties,” it is interesting to note that it ultimately said that Google’s prominent display of its own 
content in Universal Search “was a product design change.”  FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search 
Practices, supra note 1. 
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inappropriate to define the search engine based strictly on its first-generation attribute 
(search), and to classify additional features and improvements (such as universal search) 
later integrated into the search engine product as vertical markets.  Since essential facility 
and foreclosure are typically predicated on separate markets, there would be no basis to 
speak in terms of those concepts in the absence of separate markets.  For now, however, 
let us set aside this issue and simply consider the duty to deal and essential facility 
paradigms on their own terms. 
III. ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
¶26  In general terms, the essential facilities doctrine holds that where a monopolist has 
bottleneck control over an input or resource (facility) essential for competition, usually in 
a secondary market, and the facility cannot be duplicated, the monopolist must share 
access to that facility with its competitors in the secondary market if it is feasible to do 
so.
70
  To those who fear Google’s possible “leverage” of its leading position in one area 
(general search) into other business areas, the doctrine may seem promising.
71
  However, 
a closer look shows that the doctrine is legally incongruous in the context of search. 
¶27  In Trinko, the Supreme Court severely restricted a monopolist’s antitrust duty to 
deal with rivals,
72
 and in the process made clear its deep skepticism of the essential 
facilities doctrine.
73
  It described the doctrine as having been “crafted by some lower 
courts”74 and refused to recognize (or repudiate) it.75  But even before Trinko, courts 
rarely required monopolists to assist their rivals under section 2, whether or not the duty 
to assist was couched in terms of sharing access to an essential facility.
76
  The rationale 
for this caution centers on economic concerns that mandated dealings would decrease 
incentives for investment and innovation, which would undermine the underlying 
 
70
 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 771a (4th 
ed. 2012). 
71
 There is considerable economic debate over whether monopoly leverage makes sense as an 
anticompetitive strategy.  Chicago School scholars have long argued that it does not because a monopolist 
cannot increase its total profits through monopoly extension, due to the single-monopoly profit theory.  
Therefore, monopoly leverage must be motivated by efficiency concerns such as the desire to eliminate 
double marginalization.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 372–75 (1978).  Post-Chicago scholars have countered that the single monopoly profit theory only 
holds under a strict set of conditions, such as when the complementary products are consumed in fixed 
proportions, which seldom exist in real world markets.  See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & William N. 
Hebert, Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Markets, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 455, 465 
n.39 (2008); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
525–38 (1985).  For the purposes of this article, I will (without entering the debate) assume that monopoly 
leverage can be a rational business strategy for a vertically integrated monopolist so as to examine the duty 
to deal and essential facilities doctrine in the search context on their own terms. 
72
 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
73
 Id. at 410–11 (commenting dismissively on the essential facilities doctrine). 
74
 Id. at 410. 
75
 Id. at 411 (“We have never recognized such a doctrine and we find no need either to recognize it or to 
repudiate it here.” (citation omitted)). 
76
 See Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal With Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1206-07 (2002) 
(observing that “lower courts have adopted a conservative approach to imposing a duty to share essential 
facilities” and that the success rate of plaintiffs in these cases is very low); Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, 
Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 359, 363–64 (2008) (concluding that plaintiffs rarely 
won essential facility cases). 
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purposes of antitrust law.
77
  The following section examines the highly limited use of the 
essential facilities doctrine and suggests that the conditions for its possible application are 
wanting, in almost every respect, in the context of search rankings. 
A. Natural Monopoly and Public Utilities—Restrictive Commonalities in the 
Foundational Cases 
¶28  Though the Supreme Court in Trinko refuted the notion that any of its earlier 
decisions should be read as endorsing the essential facilities doctrine,
78
 it stopped short of 
repudiating it.  Thus, it is informative to briefly examine two Supreme Court cases most 
often cited (until Trinko) as essential facility precedents, United States v. Terminal 
Railroad Association of St. Louis
79
 and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
80
 before 




¶29  In Terminal Railroad, a coalition of railroad companies that had purchased control 
of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi River in St. Louis, along with other terminal 
facilities, refused to grant competing railroads access to those facilities.
82
  The bridge was 
indispensable to the competing railroads and the railroad was critical to transportation in 
that era.  In Otter Tail, the defendant was a vertically integrated, regulated power 
company that generated wholesale power, engaged in its retail distribution, and also 
owned the transmission lines.  The power company refused to “wheel” wholesale power 
through its transmission lines for municipalities that wanted to operate their own retail 
distribution systems.
83
  Access to the transmission lines was obviously essential for the 
 
77
 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08; see also Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of 
Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 851 (1990) (“[A]ny essential facilities doctrine must recognize 
[limitations]. . . .  [These include] the general concern that the defendant never would have built a [facility] 
of that size and character in the first place if he had known that he would be required to share it.  Required 
sharing discourages building facilities such as this, even though they benefit consumers.”).  The general 
disapproval of the imposition of a duty to deal may also be a visceral reaction against what some consider 
to be the doctrine’s infringement of another’s property rights, which includes the right to exclude others if 
she so wishes.  See, id. at 852 n.46 (“The trouble with . . . the essential facilities notion is that [it] start[s] 
with the assumption that all business assets are subject to sharing.  Do we really want to assume that 
everything we have is up for grabs?”). 
78
 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 (dismissively describing the doctrine as merely a creation of the lower 
courts). 
79
 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
80
 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
81
 A third Supreme Court decision sometimes considered an essential facility case is Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).  Associated Press did not involve a traditional natural monopoly or public 
utility, but it had peculiarities that suggest that it was more of a section 1 conspiracy case.  It involved a 
combination of some 1,200 newspapers, forming the Associated Press (AP), who pooled their efforts to 
produce and distribute news.  The association’s bylaws permitted any existing member to veto member 
applications from its rivals.  This was clearly concerted action and not a simple unilateral refusal to deal.  
The veto provision was also particularly problematic as it seemed to have had no purpose other than to 
protect incumbents from potential competition.  The selective rejection of applications, turning on nothing 
more than the applicant’s status as an existing member’s rival, places this case squarely in the section 1 
conspiracy category, and some lower courts have declined to view Associated Press as a precedent for 
unilateral refusal-to-deal cases.  See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
82
 For details of the facts of the case, see Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1195–98 (1999). 
83
 Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368–72. 
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municipalities because there was no other way to transport the wholesale power from its 
source to the municipalities’ local distribution systems.   
¶30  A commonality in Terminal Railroad and Otter Tail is that both facilities in 
question were natural monopolies: each enjoyed large economies of scale relative to 
demand such that the market could only efficiently support a single producer or 
provider.
84
  Otter Tail was additionally a price-regulated public utility.
85
   
¶31  Of two lower court cases generally credited with developing the doctrine, one, MCI 
Communications Corp. v. AT&T,
86
 clearly involved a natural monopoly facility, and the 
other, Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
87
 concerned a facility that closely resembled one.  
AT&T, the then-regulated integrated telephone monopolist in MCI, had a natural 
monopoly in local telephone service,
88
 but its long-distance monopoly was threatened by 
emerging competition.  AT&T was able to foreclose competition in the long-distance 
market by refusing to allow its emerging competitors to interconnect with its local 
telephone system.
89
   
¶32  While Hecht’s government-subsidized stadium may not fit our usual conception of 
a classic natural monopoly, it can be analogized to one: the fact that public subsidies were 
necessary for its construction suggests that the market probably could not have supported 
one stadium, let alone two.  That government money was involved in the building of the 
facility was very likely an additional factor that tipped the scales toward requiring shared 
access. 
¶33  One commentator has noted that virtually every case that has found a duty to 
provide access to an essential facility has, in fact, involved a natural monopoly or 
regulated utility.
90
  Indeed, the leading antitrust treatise asserts that the doctrine could 
only be even arguably appropriate in those situations.
91
  Facilities that constitute natural 
monopolies generally make the strongest cases for compulsory access because, by 
definition, the construction of competing facilities would be economically inefficient; at 
the same time, the absence of access would eliminate downstream competition.
92
   
 
84
 See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 119–25 (1971) 
(discussing the economics of natural monopoly and the undesirability of competition in natural monopoly 
markets).  The railroad bridge could accommodate all traffic, and building another railroad bridge, even if it 
were possible, would have been economically inefficient and socially wasteful.  The same was also true for 
the transmission lines in Otter Tail; it was economically efficient to have only a single set of transmission 
lines, which apparently had sufficient capacity to serve all.   
85
 Otter Tail Power operated under long-term municipally granted franchises and was partially regulated 
by the then-Federal Power Commission under the Federal Power Act.  Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369–72. 
86
 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
87
 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
88
 MCI, 708 F.2d at 1133 (“Given present technology, local telephone service is generally regarded as a 
natural monopoly and is regulated as such.”). 
89
 See id. at 1132.  Access to the local exchange is needed to originate and complete long distance calls 
on landlines. 
90
 Robinson, supra note 76, at 120607.  But for a noteworth exception see Gamco, Inc. v. Providence 
Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952) finding the refusal to renew a tenant’s lease for 
space in a building specially located and equipped for wholesale marketing of produce was actionable 
under the essential facilities doctrine. 
91
 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶ 771c (recognizing natural monopoly, price-regulated 
monopoly utilities, and publicly owned facilities such as sports arenas as the “only three situations in which 
an essential doctrine is even arguably appropriate”). 
92
 See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 
62 SMU L. REV. 557, 567–68 (2009) (discussing why natural monopoly facilities make the strongest 
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¶34  If the doctrine were indeed limited to natural monopolies and public utilities, it 
would have no application in any case against Google based on its search practices.  
Google’s search engine, which handles only about two-thirds of the general search 
traffic,
93
 does not fit the natural monopoly or public utility framework.
94
  While search 
engines may benefit from economies of scale, there are clearly commercially viable 
general search engines that compete with Google,
95
 notably Yahoo! and Microsoft’s 
Bing, which together have an approximate 30% share of general search traffic.
96
  New 
search providers, such as DuckDuckGo and Blekko, have succeeded in obtaining venture 
capital funding, suggesting that at least some investment experts believe that there is still 
room for additional search engines.
97
  Thus, the market reality does not support the 
arguments of some commentators that Google’s search engine is a natural monopoly.98 
¶35  Analogizing search engines to public utilities would be even more forced. The term 
“public utility” generally refers to providers of indispensable services affected with the 
public interest, such as water and electricity.
99
  Because the services involved are vital, 
special obligations to serve all within a particular area at regulated prices are usually 
imposed on the provider in return for a public franchise and other government 
privileges.
100
  Even if search engines are deemed indispensable to modern life, they do 
not conform to the public utility model.  In contrast to the typical public utility, search 
engines are already universally and freely available (to anyone with a computer with 
Internet access) without any government incentives and price regulation, and they clearly 
have no government-granted franchise.
101
  To the extent that the scope of the essential 
facilities doctrine is limited to natural monopolies and public utilities, the doctrine should 
have no application in the context of search. 
 
essential facility cases). 
93
 See Zack Whittaker, comScore: Google, Bing Gain Search Share as Yahoo Dips, ZDNET (March 12, 
2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/comscore-google-bing-gain-search-share-as-yahoo-dips/71334 
(citing comScore data showing that Google had 66.4% share of the general search traffic in February 
2012). 
94
 See generally Mark A. Jamison, Should Google Search Be Regulated as a Public Utility? 6, 10 
(University of Florida—Warrington College of Business Administration, Public Utility Research Center 
working paper) (March 25, 2012), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2027543 (making the case that Google search is neither 
a natural monopoly nor a public utility). 
95
 See THE SEARCH ENGINE LIST, http://www.thesearchenginelist.com/ (last visited April 11, 2013) 
(providing a list of all search engines). 
96
 See Whittaker, supra note 93 (citing comScore data showing that Microsoft’s Bing and Yahoo had 
15.3% and 13.8%, respectively, of the general search traffic in February 2012, and Ask and AOL had 3% 
and 1.5% respectively). 
97
 See Jamison, supra note 94, at 8, 10. 
98
 But see, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Fairness, Access, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1149, 1180–82 (2008) (arguing that Google search 
exhibits the characteristics of a natural monopoly and should be regulated by the government as such). 
99
 See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 538–39 (1923). 
100
 See Barbara A. Cherry, The Political Realities of Telecommunications Policies in the U.S.: How the 
Legacy of Public Utility Regulation Constrains Adoption of New Regulatory Models, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL 
L. REV. 757, 762 (2003); Jamison, supra note 94, at 2. 
101
 Cf. Adam Thierer, The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities 38 (Mercatus 
Center at George Mason University, Working Paper No. 12-11, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025674  (arguing that social networks, such as Facebook, are not public utilities 
for various reasons, including the fact that they are “already available to everyone and are almost 
universally free of charge”).  Search engines are similar to social networks in this regard. 
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B. Monopoly Power 
¶36  However, no case has explicitly restricted the doctrine in this manner, 
notwithstanding its real-world limited application.  Instead, the Seventh Circuit imposed 
strict rules in MCI: the plaintiff must show that (1) a monopolist controls access to an 
essential facility, (2) a competitor cannot reasonably duplicate the facility, (3) the 
monopolist has denied access of the facility to a competitor, and (4) it is feasible for the 
monopolist to share access.
102
  Virtually every lower court that has subsequently 
considered an essential facility claim has adopted this stringent MCI standard.
103
   
¶37  As a threshold matter, under MCI, the owner of an alleged essential facility must 
have monopoly power in a properly defined market.
104
  Defining the market involving 
search is extremely difficult, if not impossible, because of the dynamic environment in 
which search engines compete.
105
  But, regardless of how the market is defined, it is 
doubtful that we can infer monopoly power from a search engine’s high share of general 
search traffic.  The competitive reality of the search business shows that even the largest 




1. Defining the Market in a Rapidly Changing Internet World 
¶38  Google is often said to be a monopolist in search and search advertising107 but, in 
reality, not much effort has been made to define the relevant market or to properly 
 
102
 See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–133 (7th Cir. 1983).  These rules 
reflected the reasoning previously stated by the D.C. Circuit in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 
992–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
103
 See, e.g., Integraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Caribbean Broad. 
Sys. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John 
Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 748 (3d Cir. 1996); City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 
(9th Cir. 1992); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 1991); Del. & 
Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1990); Advanced Health-Care Servs., 
Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150–51 (4th Cir. 1990); City of Malden, Mo. v. Union Elec. 
Co., 887 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir. 1989); Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 
976, 983 (9th Cir. 1988); McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 370 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on 
other grounds by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs, Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997). 
104
 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546–57 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a computerized reservation system could not be an essential facility where its control did not give the 
airline the power to “eliminate competition in a market downstream from the facility”) (emphasis in 
original); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that alleged essential 
facility does dominate a defined relevant market), vacated on non-antitrust grounds, 499 U.S. 944 (1991); 
City of Malden, Mo. v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1989) (approving jury instructions 
requiring relevant market definition in an essential facility case); Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 
328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting essential facility claim where defendant lacked market 
power in its gas transmission facilities). 
105
 See infra Part III-B-1. 
106
 See infra Part III-B-2. 
107
 See, e.g., Hearing on the Power of Google 33–35 (statement of Thomas O. Barnett, Partner, 
Covington & Burling, LLP) (“Google dominates online search in the U.S. . . .  Moreover, Google’s search 
dominance has enabled it also to dominate paid search advertising.”); Manne & Wright, Google and the 
Limits of Antitrust, supra note 37, at 194 (referring to the colloquial reference to Google as “the dominant 
search and search advertising provider in an online search market comprised of Google, Microsoft, and 
Yahoo!” and questioning its antitrust relevance); Bosker, supra note 50 (writing that the federal antitrust 
investigation into Google centers on “the company’s use of its dominant position as a search engine” to 
allegedly disadvantage its competitors in other markets).  The assumption that Google has substantial 
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evaluate whether it has monopoly power in an antitrust sense.
108
  Data shows that Google 
handles approximately two-thirds of U.S. general search queries
109
 and receives about 
three-quarters of all U.S. search-based advertising spending.
110
  Thus, working 
backwards, the underlying assumptions of the statements that Google is a monopolist 
must be that the relevant markets consist of general search (queries on general search 
engines) and search-based advertising, and that substantial market power can be inferred 
from high market shares.  Both assumptions are suspect, however, given that search 
engines compete in an environment characterized by unceasing change.
111
 
¶39  An antitrust market is basically the smallest grouping of products or services that a 
firm would need to control in order to raise prices profitably without competitive 
constraints.  Defining the market generally entails identifying and including all 
reasonable substitutes available to the buyer for the seller’s product.112  In the Internet 
world, where new technologies frequently emerge to displace the old and products are in 
a constant state of change, this is an almost hopeless task.
113
  But while the relevant 
market may be practically impossible to define, it is unlikely to be as narrow as general 
search (on the user side) and search-based advertising (on the advertiser side)
114
 because 
both users and advertisers have reasonable alternatives to general search engines for their 
needs.
115
    
 
monopoly power in search is also implicit in the commentaries arguing for the need to regulate Google’s 
dominant search engine.  See generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 98. 
108
 For the few articles that that have addressed the market definition issue in search, see Manne & 
Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust, supra note 37, at 194–203; Mark R. Patterson, Google and 
Search Engine Market Power (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2047047, 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047047 (discussing generally the difficulties of assessing Google’s market 
power and tentatively suggesting pricing of Google’s search advertising as a means of measuring power). 
109
 See Whittaker, supra note 93 (citing February 2012 comScore data showing Google’s share of 
general search traffic was 66.4%, while Bing and Yahoo! had 15.3% and 13.8%, respectively). 
110
 See Brian Womack, Google Increases U.S. Search Market Share as Yahoo Slips, ComScore Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2011, 6:17 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-09/google-gains-u-s-
search-market-share-in-october-comscore-says.html (reporting comScore data showing that Google has 
about 76% of search-based advertising dollars while Microsoft and Yahoo! collectively have 16%).   
111
 See, e.g., Jamison, supra note 94, at 12 (“[T]he definition of search and the technologies of search are 
moving targets.  For example, Apple is not considered a direct rival [of Google] in general search, but its 
Siri product could be the next generation of search. . . .  Services such as Yelp and UrbanSpoon for 
restaurants, and MapQuest for locations, are constantly changing and redefining the meaning of search.”); 
Stephen D. Houck, The Microsoft Case and Google, 5 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (May 14, 2012) 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-microsoft-case-and-google/ (arguing that consumers 
have many options and, given the unceasing change and innovation that characterize competition on the 
Internet, Google search does not have durable market power). 
112
 See United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (appraising the cross-
elasticity of demand and determining whether the product in question has reasonable substitutes; if it does, 
the reasonable substitutes should be included in the market definition). 
113
 There is seldom any econometric data available to determine cross-elasticities of demand in very 
dynamic markets, and qualitative assessments as to reasonable substitutes may be imprecise.  Also, where 
technology changes rapidly, it is perilous to assume that the contours of a market will remain stable for any 
length of time. 
114
 Search engines are multi-sided platforms, and thus there is more than one market definition.  It is 
generally assumed that the relevant market on the user side is general search (search conducted on general 
search engines) and that the relevant market on the advertiser side is search advertising.  For a discussion of 
multi-sided platforms, which include search engines and social networks, see generally David S. Evans, 
Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201. 
115
 For a detailed analysis of the market definition issue in search, see generally Manne & Wright, 
Google and the Limits of Antitrust, supra note 37. 
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¶40  Users who are interested in a specific category of content can, and often do, turn to 
specialized websites for information, bypassing general search engines.
116
    Studies show 
that search on these specialized sites, which include Amazon, eBay, and Facebook, now 
accounts for over one-third of all web searches.
117
  Amazon and eBay alone handle ten 
times more product searches than Google.
118
 
¶41  Social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, present another alternative to 
general search engines in certain contexts.  Though we normally do not associate social 
networks with search, they offer features for finding information that increasingly appeal 
to users.
119
  Facebook now far surpasses Google as the most visited site on the Internet,
120
 
and its competitive challenge is expected to further intensify as it strengthens its alliance 
with Bing, which already powers Facebook searches.
121
  Twitter’s timely search feature 
has reportedly already prompted a competitive response from Google—a recent tweaking 
of its algorithm to provide more timely search.
122
 
¶42  Mobile apps may also be considered a substitute for search in certain contexts for a 
large segment of Internet users.
123
  As with social networks, while we may not 
 
116
 See Eli Goodman, Searcher Intent: Why Vertical Search is Now Giving Ground to Core Search, 
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Blog/Searcher_Intent_Why_Vertical_Search_is_Now_Giving_Ground
_to_Core_Search, (“If you only desire travel searches, you best go to an Online Travel Agent because they 
are the only ones that really understand your travel needs and won’t inundate you with extraneous results. 
Same idea with shopping engines or job search sites – the results you get will be filtered to the right 
universe of results you’re seeking.”).  
117
 See id. (“In August 2011, of the 27 billion searches conducted on desktops in the United States, more 
than one-third occurred on non-search engines.  Search on sites like Amazon, eBay, and Facebook has been 
growing faster than (and therefore gaining market share from) the core search engines for years.”).  
Goodman, however, reports that this growth of searches on non-search engines has leveled off as general 
search engines have refined their algorithms to better understand the intent behind searcher’s search 
queries.   
118
 See Jacques Bughin et al., The Impact of Internet Technologies: Search, MCKINSEY & CO. (July, 
2011), http://www.gstatic.com/ads/research/en/2011_Impact_of_Search.pdf. 
119
 See id. at 7, 13 (showing, in a study published in 2011, that “30 percent of US Internet users now use 
social networks to find content” and “users are increasingly navigating to websites from links on social 
networks”).  
120
 See NIELSEN, STATE OF THE MEDIA: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT 2, 5 (Q3 2011), 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2011-Reports/nielsen-social-
media-report.pdf (showing in the 2011 report that users spend over five times as much time on social 
networks and blogs as on search engines, and more time on Facebook than the next four most popular web 
brands combined). 
121
 See Nick Wingfield, A Revamping of Bing in the Battle for Search Engine Supremacy, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/technology/bing-search-engine-to-
be-revamped-as-war-against-google-intensifies.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on the deepening of the 
Bing/Facebook alliance). 
122
 See Claire Cain Miller, Google Changes Search Algorithm, Trying to Make Results More Timely, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 3, 2011, 1:23 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/google-
changes-search-algorithm-trying-to-make-results-more-timely (“The new algorithm is a recognition that 
Google, whose dominance depends on providing the most useful results, is being increasingly challenged 
by services like Twitter and Facebook, which have trained people to expect constant updates with seconds-
old news.”). 
123
 The momentum is shifting toward using smartphones rather than computers to access information 
available on the Internet.  See Jenna Wortham, A Billion-Dollar Turning Point for Mobile Apps, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/technology/instagram-deal-
is-billion-dollar-move-toward-cellphone-from-pc.html (giving the shift in momentum as one reason for 
Facebook’s recent deal to purchase Instagram, a mobile app start-up, for $1 billion). 
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immediately associate mobile apps with search, they fulfill aspects of that function.
124
  
An increasing number of Americans use smartphones,
125
 and smartphone users are 




¶43  Like users, advertisers also have alternatives to Google’s general search engine 
platform.  The objective of advertisers who purchase search-based advertising on search 
engines is to promote their products or brand to potential customers.  To the extent that 
users now spend much of their online time using social networks, these networks are a 
logically attractive alternative or supplemental advertising platform for advertisers.  
Unsurprisingly, a recent survey of online advertisers showed the greatest growth of 
online advertising spending in 2011 occurred on Facebook.
127
   
¶44  While advertising on Facebook is in the form of “display ads,” there is no apparent 
economic reason for treating display ads and search-based advertising as being in 
distinct, relevant markets.
128
  If display ads are included in the relevant market with 
search-based advertising, Google does not have sufficient market share to be considered a 
monopolist.  Facebook currently leads in the display ads category with about 30% share, 
while Google trails with less than 5%.
129
  To limit the relevant market (on the advertiser 




¶45  My purpose in this discussion is not to try to define the relevant antitrust market for 
search, because it is likely impossible to do so in a morphing and open Internet world.  
Rather, it is simply to suggest that this market cannot be as narrow as general search for 
users or search advertising for advertisers.  Search engines, social networks and mobile 
devices, their related technologies and business models, and user behavior are evolving 
so rapidly that it is unrealistic to view general search engines as completely distinct from 
other forms of competition in the digital information world. 
 
124
 See John Battelle, The Evolving Search Interface: Mobile Drives Search as App, JOHN BATTELLE’S 
SEARCH BLOG (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://battellemedia.com/archives/2010/01/the_evolving_search_interface_mobile_drives_search_as_app.p
hp (“On their face, these apps don’t seem like search at all. Except they are.”). 
125
 Smartphones Continue to Gain Share as US Usage Plateaus, EMARKETER (April 9, 2012), 
http://www.emarketer.com/Mobile/Article.aspx?R=1008958 (projecting that smartphone use will reach 
about 60% of the American population by 2016). 
126
 See Aaron Goldman, Mobile Matters: 15 Mobile Search Stats that Ring True, SEARCH INSIDER (Oct. 
19, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/160766/mobile-matters-15-mobile-
search-stats-that-ring-t.html (“Behold the biggest threat to mobile search—apps. . . .  It’s much easier to 
interact with content through an app than through Web pages.”). 
127
 See ECONSULTANCY DIGITAL MARKETERS UNITED, Sample: Online Advertisers Survey Report 2011, 
at 5 (Sept. 2011), http://econsultancy.com/us/reports/online-advertising-survey/downloads/4073-sample-
online-advertisers-survey-report-2011-pdf 2011) (“The fastest growing area of investment is Facebook 
advertising, where almost three-quarters . . . of respondents say they have increased spending in the last 12 
months.”). 
128
 See Jamison, supra note 94, at 17 (citing a 2011 survey finding that 23% of online advertisers had 
recently shifted budget from search to display ads). 
129
 ClickZ, ComScore: Facebook’s Share of Display Ads Reaches 28%, MASHABLE (Jan. 31, 2012),  
http://mashable.com/2012/01/31/comscore-facebooks-share-ads/.  
130
 In fact, there is some evidence that online and offline advertisements compete with each other as 
well.  See generally Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Search Engine Advertising: Channel Substitution 
When Pricing Ads to Context, 57 MGMT. SCI. 458 (2011). 
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2. Inference of Durable Monopoly Power? 
¶46  More importantly, regardless of how the market is defined, it is doubtful that 
monopoly power can be inferred from a high market share, given the nature of 
competition in search and on the Internet generally.  Unhappy search engine users can 
instantly switch from one search engine to another without incurring any penalties or 
costs.  Google’s market share is also vulnerable to erosion from new waves of products or 
services (not general search engines) that are able to satisfy consumers’ evolving 
preferences in the way they seek and experience Internet information.
131
  On the 
advertisers’ side of the platform, advertising spending logically follows users.  Thus, 
Google’s market position in online advertising can be no stronger or more durable than 
its market position with users. 
¶47  In antitrust, market share in a properly defined market is often used as a proxy for 
market power:
132
 monopoly power is inferred from a firm’s substantial market share 
within the defined market, though the inference may be qualified by ease of entry.
133
  
Market share is normally a reasonable surrogate for power because firms with large 
market shares can typically raise prices profitably without competitive constraints.  Their 
small rivals’ competitive response will usually be limited because these rivals lack the 
capacity to quickly increase output to meet the demand of the dominant firm’s disaffected 
customers.  Thus, a dominant firm is not constrained by the fear of losing substantial 
sales to its rivals if it raises prices or otherwise acts anticompetitively. 
¶48  In the context of search, however, this analysis does not hold, and high market 
shares are not good surrogates for market power.  It is possible for smaller search 
engines, such as Bing and Yahoo!, to constrain Google because they can easily and 
immediately “increase output” to serve the needs of unhappy Google users looking for an 
alternative.  A search engine’s “product” is information (search results) automatically 
generated by an algorithm that is available.  Thus, “product expansion” to meet increased 
demand basically means automatically applying an existing algorithm to answer more 
search queries, which can be easily accomplished with no time lag, unlike the product 
expansion of other more prototypical goods and services.  While a search engine might 
have to expand its server capacity if demand from new users increases significantly, this 
limitation is small compared to the costs and other usual difficulties of output expansion 
for the typical good or service. 
¶49  Additionally, switching to another search engine is easy for users.  There are no 
switching costs and no user lock-in.  Studies show that a majority of users regularly use 
 
131
 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 111, at 7 (discussing the mutability of competition on the Internet and 
why it is not conducive to durable market power for Google). 
132
 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that 
90% market share is clearly sufficient to constitute a monopoly, 60–64% is unlikely to be sufficient, and 
33% is clearly not enough to find monopoly power). 
133
 In contemporary antitrust analysis, courts often look to entry barriers to qualify inferences drawn 
from market shares.  Ease of entry could rebut the inference of market power from high market shares.  
See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that looking only 
at market share to infer market power can be misleading but finding that barriers to entry existed to protect 
Microsoft’s operating systems market share); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 99 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (finding that, though a 70% share of the relevant market was strong evidence of monopoly 
power, it was rebutted by ease of entry); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 899 F.2d 951, 967 
(10th Cir. 1990) (considering entry barriers, supply and demand elasticities, and other factors when 
drawing inferences from market share data). 
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more than one search engine,
134
 and 89% would use a different search engine if they 
could not find the information they were seeking with their preferred engine.
135
  A well-
publicized incident involving a one-hour glitch on Google in 2009
136
 illustrates both the 
ease of turning to another search engine and users’ readiness to do so if their preferred 
engine fails to meet their expectations.  In that one hour of poor Google performance, the 
number of Yahoo! searches doubled, indicating that a large number of Google users had 
immediately moved to Yahoo!, though they returned to Google when the problem was 
solved.
137
   
¶50  This suggests that, despite its current high market share in general search, Google 
does not have much market power in an antitrust sense as there are competitive 
constraints on its ability to act anticompetitively.  The history of search is, in fact, replete 
with examples of companies with dominant shares that quickly lost their dominance 
when superior products became available or when consumer preferences simply changed.  
AltaVista and Lycos, for example, were popular search engines in the early Internet days 
but have largely disappeared.
138
  In 1998, the year that Google was incorporated,
139
 
Fortune declared that Yahoo! had “won the search wars.”140  Yet Google surpassed 
Yahoo! only a few years later.
141
  Google should be no more insulated from competition 
than the earlier dominant search engines if it ceases to be innovative, if it ceases to 
anticipate user desires, or if a better product is introduced. 
¶51  Durability of market power is also less likely in a dynamic market, where products 
constantly evolve and new competitors (and new forms of competition) frequently 
emerge to change the face of competition.  For example, while Apple may not be a direct 
 
134
 See Alex Chitu, Google's Competition is One Click Away, GOOGLE OPERATING SYSTEM (May 11, 
2009, 2:37 AM), http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2009/05/googles-competition-is-one-click-away.html 
(referring to a 2008 Forrester study finding that 55% of United States Internet users regularly use more than 
one search engine); see also Op-Ed, The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A30, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15thu3.html (pointing out that Google competitors are only a 
click away). 
135
 Press Release, PERFORMICS, Search Engine Usage Study: 92 Percent of Searchers Click on 
Sponsored Results (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.performics.com/news-room/press-releases/Search-Engine-
Usage-Study-92-Percent/1422 (showing that Google users use a different search engine at least 
occasionally, and 89% of users try another search engine if their preferred engine does not generate the 
information they are looking for). 
136
 See Marissa Mayer, “This Site May Harm Your Computer” on Every Search Result?!?!, GOOGLE: 
OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 31, 2009), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/01/this-site-may-harm-your-
computer-on.html (describing the problem which consisted of a message “This site may harm your 
computer” being included with every Google search result). 
137
 See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Fresh Evidence That Search Is Still Competitive? Not So Fast, WALL ST. J. 
BLOGS:  DIGITS (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/03/17/fresh-evidence-that-
search-is-still-competitive-not-so-fast/.  
138
 See Phillip Bump, Flashback from 1998: When Altavista, Lycos, and Blue Mountain Arts Ruled the 
Web, GEEKOSYSTEM, (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.geekosystem.com/1998-web-traffic-stats/.   
139
 Our History in Depth, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/company/history.html (last 
visited June 2, 2012). 
140
 Randall E. Stross, How Yahoo! Won the Search Wars Once Upon a Time, Yahoo! Was an Internet 
Search Site with Mediocre Technology. Now it has a Market Cap of $2.8 Billion.  Some People Say it’s the 
Next America Online, CNNMONEY: FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 1998),  
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/03/02/238576/index.htm.  
141
 See Hearings on the Power of Google, supra note 35, at 38–40 (statement of Susan A. Creighton, 
Partner, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati); see also Our History in Depth, supra note 139 (indicating 
that Google officially became the world’s largest search engine in June 2000 when it had indexed over one 
billion websites). 
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Google competitor in search, its new Siri product could develop into the future generation 
of search.
142
  Existing market players and rivals are also entering into joint ventures that 
expand or change the contours of the market.
143
  One example is the Bing/Facebook 
alliance which, among other things, is expected to provide a new search experience by 
tapping into the user’s Facebook network.144  In the face of the rapid transformation and 
innovation occurring on the Internet, it is unlikely that Google could exercise monopoly 
power. 
¶52  On the advertising side, it is also doubtful that Google has durable monopoly 
power.  Logically, if general search engine users increasingly turn to Facebook or other 
non-general search engines for information and entertainment, advertisers will adjust 
their advertising budgets accordingly.  Indeed, a survey showed that advertising spending 
on Facebook, not search engines, experienced the greatest growth in 2011, and that 35% 
of online advertisers had moved budget from search advertising to advertising on 
Facebook.
145
    
¶53  Businesses are also free to advertise on multiple search engines (assuming they win 
the keyword auctions) since they are not bound by any exclusive contracts with 
Google.
146
  Since search-based advertising costs are based on the number of user clicks 
on a paid link,
147
 firms can purchase search advertising on more than one search engine 
without having to effectively double or triple their advertising spending.  If users leave 
Google for Bing, for example, an advertiser with paid links on both search engines would 
likely experience an increase in user clicks on its search advertisements on Bing and a 
decrease in the clicks on its paid links on Google.  Thus, an increase in the firm’s 
advertising costs on Bing would probably be roughly evened out by a corresponding 
decrease in costs for the same advertising on Google, making search-based advertising on 
more than one search-engine economically viable.
148
 
¶54  In short, no matter how the market for search engines is defined on either the user 
or advertiser side, it is unlikely that Google’s current significant market share will give it 
durable monopoly power.  The open and dynamic Internet information market in which 
Google competes is simply not conducive to the exercise of monopoly power.  Indeed, 
none of the characteristics usually associated with monopoly power—high prices, lack of 
 
142
 See Dan Kaplan, Siri, Quora, and the Future of Search, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 16, 2011) 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/16/siriquora-and-the-future-of-search.  
143
 See Wingfield, supra note 121 (reporting on the strengthening of ties between Bing and Facebook). 
144
 Search results on Bing for “best hotels in Maui,” for example, would include relevant information, 
recommendations, and pictures gleaned from the postings of the user’s Facebook friends.  See id.  The user 
could then also interact with those friends and seek additional information from them without leaving the 
Bing results page.  See id. 
145
 See Jamison, supra note 94, at 17 (citing an eConsultancy 2011 report). 
146
 See AdWords Terms and Conditions, GOOGLE (Aug. 22, 2006), 
https://www.google.com/intl/en_us/adwords/select/TCUSbilling0806.html (containing no exclusivity 
obligations). 
147
 See Manne & Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What’s the Question, supra note 37, at 16–
17 (discussing the click-through pricing system of “sponsored links” or search-based advertisements). 
148
 One of two changes Google voluntarily committed to make in its search practices was to eliminate a 
particular restriction on the use of its search advertising platform.  The removal of the restriction would 
facilitate advertisers’ management of their ad campaigns across different search engines.  See Google’s 
Commitment Letter, supra note 4; FTC Release, supra note 2. 
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innovation, unresponsiveness to customers, complacency, and indifference toward 
competitors
149—seem applicable to Google. 
C. Essentiality, Denial of Access, and “Nonrivalrousness” Concepts 
¶55  In addition to monopoly power, other elements must be satisfied before the 
essential facilities doctrine can be successfully invoked: the “facility” controlled by the 
monopolist must be essential and practically infeasible to duplicate, the monopolist must 
have denied competitors access to it, and the facility must be capable of being shared.
150
  
The latter two factors—denial of access and the sharability (nonrivalrousness) of the 
facility—have been mostly overlooked in the debate on search ranking.  On the first 
factor, essentiality, critics tend to generally assert that Google is the gateway to the 
Internet, and thus essential for both users and websites,
151
 but do not discuss the issue in 
greater depth. 
1. Essentiality 
¶56  Essentiality has always been strictly construed, perhaps because firms in a 
competitive economy are normally expected to rely on their own resources to compete.  
To be deemed essential, a facility or input must be critical to competitive viability, not 
merely desirable or superior to the alternatives.
152
  In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United 
Airlines, Inc.,
153
 the Ninth Circuit concluded, after analyzing a number of cases, that “[a] 
facility that is controlled by a single firm will be considered ‘essential’ only if control of 
the facility carries with it the power to eliminate competition in the downstream 
market.”154  Moreover, the “power to eliminate competition must not be momentary, but 
must be at least relatively permanent.”155   
¶57  Every key essential facility case that has mandated access has involved a resource 
that unmistakably met this strict standard.  For example, absent access to the railroad 
 
149
 See United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Many people 
believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and 
depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial 
progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well 
enough alone.”). 
150
 See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, 
Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
151
 See, e.g., Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 98, at 1152–71 (elaborating on the argument that search 
engines serve as gatekeepers of the Internet and calling for their regulation). 
152
 See, e.g., Castelli v. Meadville Med. Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 872 F.2d 
411 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that a small-town hospital was not an essential facility for an excluded doctor, 
where the doctor could perform surgical procedures in other reasonable alternative facilities, including in 
an outpatient setting in an office); see also McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 371 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting essential facilities 
claims where the plaintiff wanted to be able to advertise in a competitor’s magazine—the alleged essential 
facility—because, the court held, it was free to create its own magazine or advertise through other 
channels); Areeda, supra note 77, at 852 (adding that “critical to the plaintiff’s competitive viability” 
means that the plaintiff cannot compete effectively without it and practical alternatives or duplication are 
not available).  
153
 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991). 
154
 Id. at 544; see also City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(citing Alaska Airlines on this point, though not reaching the factual issue in the case). 
155
 Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 544 n.11. 
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bridge in Terminal Railroad, railroad competition in the region would have been 
impossible (and duplicating the bridge was not reasonably feasible given the terrain and 
prohibitive costs).
156
  Similarly, without access to the monopolist utility’s transmission 
lines in Otter Tail, the municipalities could not have competed in the retail distribution of 
power; they would have had no means to transmit the power purchased wholesale to the 
local distribution systems.
157
  Like the railroad bridge, the transmission lines were not 
practically feasible to duplicate.  AT&T’s local telephone exchanges in MCI were 
likewise indispensable to any long-distance telephone service competitor, because 
interconnection was absolutely necessary to either originate or complete long-distance 
calls.  The entire local exchange network was also practically infeasible to duplicate.
158
 
¶58  Where a reasonable functional alternative to a facility exists, courts have generally 
rejected essentiality arguments.  For example, the Third Circuit affirmed a finding that 
the only hospital in a small town was not essential for an excluded doctor because 
alternative settings for surgical procedures existed—such as outpatient care in a doctor’s 
office.
159
  In a case where a downstream competitor wanted access to a dominant firm’s 
magazine for advertising, the Second Circuit found that the “facility” was not essential 
since the plaintiff could advertise through other channels or create its own magazine.
160
  
The need for stringency in the essentiality standard is not particularly controversial and 
has been embraced by even the doctrine’s strongest champions.161   
¶59  Google’s search engine can hardly be considered “essential” under this strict 
standard or even under a more lenient one.  There are other comparable search engines, 
notably Bing and Yahoo!, and possibly newer ones such as DuckDuckGo and Blekko, to 
which users can easily switch without incurring any costs, and through which websites 
can reach potential customers.
162
     
¶60  Moreover, search engines themselves are not essential portals from the perspective 
of any side in the multi-sided search engine platform.  For users, while search engines 
may be useful, they are not indispensable for reaching information on the internet.  We 
can access any website by typing its uniform resource locator (URL) into a browser, or 
from links appearing on other websites, in emails, or on social networks.
163
  Many 
Internet users often know which websites they wish to access without conducting a 
search.
164
  A recent report shows, for example, that a large percentage of traffic to the top 
 
156
 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 395–97 (1912). 
157
 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369–70 (1973). 
158
 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983). 
159
 Castelli v. Meadville Med. Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 872 F.2d 411 (3d 
Cir. 1989); see also McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.d 365, 371 (10th Cir. 1988); Scott D. Makar, The 
Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 927–43 (1994) 
(surveying a line of unsuccessful essential facilities cases in the health care area). 
160
 Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1990). 
161
 See Waller, supra note 76, at 376 (“[T]he very definition of infrastructure means that questions of 
open access would not arise in the first place if the plaintiff can compete without access to the defendant’s 
facility or can duplicate that facility itself.”); Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing 
Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 11 (2008). 
162
 See supra notes 97–99, 137–40 and accompanying text. 
163
 See BUGHIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 13 (showing that users navigate to online content through 
various features or websites, in addition to search engines, including social networks, search toolbars, 
bookmarks, portal websites, links from friends via email, and direct entry of web address). 
164
 See David Gelles, Facebook’s Grand Plan for the Future, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2010, 5:24 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/57933bb8-fcd9-11df-ae2d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1H27SlrZM (noting that 
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thirty websites is not routed to them through Google,
165
 which suggests that a search 
engine, though useful, is not essential for customer access. 
¶61  More importantly, there are increasingly additional sources that are not general 
search engines to which users can turn to locate useful information.  Specialized 
websites, such as Amazon, eBay, and Tripadvisor, are already popular with users whose 
queries pertain to products and services.
166
  Facebook and other social networks are also 
rapidly becoming important portals of online information;
167
 a recent McKinsey study 
shows that about one-third of U.S. Internet users now use social networks to find 
content.
168
  Mobile apps provide another convenient way to access Internet information 
for smartphone users,
169
 who reportedly far prefer apps to mobile search in certain 
contexts because of their relative ease of use.
170
  As more people use smartphones and as 
more apps are developed, mobile apps could become an even more important avenue for 
seeking digital information. 
¶62  For content and service providers, Google’s search platform is also not strictly 
essential.  Ranking high in the organic results of the most popular search engine is 
undoubtedly an excellent way to reach potential customers.  Studies have shown that top 
rankings on a results page receive the vast majority of all user attention, with the first 
spot receiving twice as many user clicks as the second.
171
  But providers that have been 
displaced by a search engine’s own content in the coveted top ranking, or who otherwise 
fail to attain the high ranking that they desire, certainly have alternative ways of 
attracting customers.
172
   
¶63  They can purchase advertising through a wide range of media, including search-
based advertising on any general search engine, display ads on Facebook and other 
websites, or on more traditional offline broadcast and print advertising platforms.
173
  
Alternatively, providers can enter into creative alliances with other market participants; 
one such example is the recent Bing/Yelp deal which will result in excerpts of Yelp 
restaurant reviews being prominently featured in searches on Bing.
174
  They can also 
expand their mobile apps, as Yelp has recently done, to allow smartphone users to access 
 
while many computer users use a search engine as an access point to the Internet, many more do not). 
165
 CITIGROUP, INC., Citi’s Annual Net Influence Report, at 3 (Feb. 5, 2012), 
https://ir.citi.com/Nz%2FXjA8taabnbYmERmo1s9uJ10gHQZa35F5WBi9%2B98Tl8SNeGUKS4g%3D%3
D (reporting that Google accounts for only 16% of traffic to the top thirty websites). 
166
 See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. 
167
 See supra notes 118–34 and accompanying text. 
168
 BUGHIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 7. 
169
 See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
170
 See supra note 126. 
171
 See Daniel Ruby, The Value of Google Result Positioning, CHITIKA INSIGHTS (May 25, 2010), 
http://insights.chitika.com/2010/the-value-of-google-result-positioning (showing that the top-ranked result 
received more than a third of users clicks, the second-ranked received about 17%, and the tenth-ranked less 
than 3%). 
172
 See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
173
 The evidence is mixed as to whether online and offline advertising are reasonable substitutes for each 
other.  Some studies suggest that they are, while others show that offline advertising is not as effective as 
online advertising for online-only retailers.  See Manne & Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust, supra 
note 37, at 197–98 (discussing various studies and anecdotal evidence). 
174
 See AP, Yelp Serves Restaurant Reviews to Microsoft’s Bing, USA TODAY (June 14, 2012),  
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-06-14/yelp-bing/55600758/1.  
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their services directly, bypassing search engines.
175
  Though being top-ranked in 
Google’s organic results may be a superior (and free) platform for targeting potential 
customers relative to the alternatives, that reason alone probably will not suffice to render 
Google’s search platform “essential” for competitive viability. 
¶64  Almost inextricable from the essentiality concept is the infeasibility of duplication 
requirement.
176
  It must be shown that the functionality of the facility, not necessarily the 
facility itself, cannot be reasonably duplicated or obtained from another source.
177
  From 
a rival content provider’s perspective, the functionality of Google search is the platform’s 
ability to help the rival reach potential customers in an ancillary market in which Google 
also competes.  Thus, to the extent that there are ways for businesses to promote 
themselves other than through high visibility in the top ranks of the organic results, 
duplication of the facility would be considered reasonably feasible. 
2. Is There Denial of Access? 
¶65  Denial of access, which must be found under the MCI test,178 is generally clear-cut 
and a non-issue in essential facility cases.  However, in the case of search, the question is 
complicated and largely overlooked.  It is not even clear which is the alleged essential 
facility.  If it is the search engine, then there is no denial of access at all.  The websites of 
Google’s vertical rivals, such as Mapquest or Kayak, are readily accessible to anyone 
using Google search via various keywords (or via searching the business name, or a 
portion of it).  They are not excluded from the search process, though for certain queries, 
Google may display its own property prominently, whereas a rival website is lower in the 
rankings or is not shown at all. 
¶66  For example, enter “map sites” (or “Mapquest”) into the Google search box, and 
the organic results listing will lead off with a link to the Mapquest site.  However, if a 
user enters “Starbucks,” Google will automatically return a Google map marking the 
Starbucks locations closest to the user along with the usual relevant links.   
¶67  As another example, type in “travel sites” as the search query in Google, and the 
organic search results will display links to Google’s major competitors in travel in the 
following order: Kayak, Expedia, Hotwire, Priceline, Orbitz, Travelocity , Travelzoo, and 
Tripadvisor.
179
  But if one enters “Newark to San Francisco” as the search query, Google 
will return its “universal search” results (listing a few select flights and integrating a 
flight search box) ahead of links to the major travel sites.   
 
175
 Anthony Ha, Yelp’s Jeremey Stoppelman on Mobile: Apps Account for Majority of Weekend 
Searches, Ads Coming Soon, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Aug. 1, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/01/yelp-
mobile-ads/.  
176
 See, e.g., MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983) (setting forth “a 
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility” as the second element 
necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 
982, 99–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
177
 See Robinson, supra note 76, at 1211–12 (“What is important is not whether a particular asset owned 
by a monopolist can be duplicated but whether the specific economic uses performed by the asset can be 
replicated.”). 
178
 MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132–33 (setting forth “the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor” as the 
third element necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine). 
179
 Travel Sites, GOOGLE, http://google.com/search?q=travel%20sites (last visited April 12, 2013). 
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¶68  In a search for “restaurant review sites” on Google, Urbanspoon and Yelp top the 
organic results listing.
180
  However, a search for “San Francisco restaurants” will yield 
Google’s universal search results, which include a number of San Francisco restaurant 
listings along with Google maps pinpointing their locations, and some Google reviews, 
followed by the traditional links to Yelp, OpenTable, and Zagat.  Because Google’s 
proprietary content appears first, links to Yelp and other top-ranked external sites appear 
near the middle of the results page rather than at the top, as was the case when “restaurant 
review sites” was the search query. 
¶69  Since no competitor website is excluded from the Google search platform itself for 
competitive reasons,
181
 the implicit premise of any denial of access claim must be that the 
ranked results listing is the alleged essential facility.  But even accepting this dubious 
notion of what constitutes the essential facility in search, it is still not clear that a Google 
rival has been “denied access.”  As shown, quality competitor websites, such as 
Mapquest or major travel or review sites, are still highly ranked for certain keywords, 
though perhaps not for other keywords or perhaps not as highly ranked as they were 
before Google expanded into content.  But it is conceptually difficult to equate this 
outcome to denial of access unless one takes the position that “access” requires nothing 
less than access to top ranking for all search terms that might reasonably direct traffic to 
one’s business.   
¶70  Though the issue has rarely been discussed, there is nothing to suggest that courts 
would (or should) interpret “denial of access” this loosely.  Such a construction seems 
untenable under the usual understanding of those words.  Moreover, courts have 
consistently construed essentiality strictly and, even before Trinko, have taken a 
conservative approach to the essential facilities doctrine.
182
 
3. “Nonrivalrousness,” or the Feasibility of Sharing 
¶71  An important related issue that commentators have tended to overlook is whether 
the alleged essential facility is capable of being shared in the context of search.
183
  A 
monopolist is not required to “share,” no matter how essential its facility may be to 
competition, if “sharing would be impractical or would inhibit the defendant’s ability to 
serve its customers adequately.”184  It was for that reason that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected essential facility claims in two cases that were factually similar to Otter 
Tail except on the issue of the feasibility of sharing.   
 
180
 Restaurant Review Sites, GOOGLE, http://google.com/search?q=restaurant%20review%20sites (last 
visited April 12, 2013). 
181
 Sometimes websites are removed from Google’s search index for non-competitive reasons, such as 
spam content or child pornography.  But apart from those limited categories (which have obvious pro-
consumer and social justifications for exclusion), Google does not exclude sites from its index. 
182
 See supra notes 152–61 and accompanying text; see also Robinson, supra note 76, at 1232 (“A 
review of the lower court opinions indicates that lower courts are quite conservative in their application of 
the essential facilities doctrine.”). 
183
 The feasibility of providing the facility is an element necessary to establish liability under the 
essential facility doctrine.  See, e.g., MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132–33; Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 
992–93 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
184
 Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992–93. 
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¶72  In City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.185 and City of Vernon v. 
Southern California Edison Co.,
186
 the utility company defendant would not allow 
municipalities access to its transmission lines to transmit wholesale power purchased 
from another vendor to their own local distribution systems.  The reason for the refusal 
was that the utility planned to use the full capacity of the lines if inexpensive power were 
to become available for its own purchase.
187
  Though, as in Otter Tail, the transmission 
lines were clearly essential to the municipalities if they were to run their own retail power 
distribution, the Ninth Circuit held that the monopolist utility was not under any 
obligation “to cease using its facility so that [its rival] can begin using it.”188  To require it 
to do so would “stand[] the essential facilities doctrine on its head.”189  Even the strongest 
contemporary advocates of the essential facilities doctrine seem to agree, setting as a 
condition for application under their theory the “nonrivalrous” nature of the facility or 
resource.
190
  “Nonrivalrous” means that the resource can be accessed and used by 
multiple persons at the same time—that is, a resource that is capable of being shared.191 
¶73  In the context of search, if the search engine is the alleged essential facility, then 
“shareability” does not present a problem—multiple persons can access the search engine 
at the same time.  But, in that case, there would be no denial of access.  There is no 
allegation that the website of a Google rival, such as Mapquest, Expedia or Tripadvisor, 
has been excluded from the search process.  The claim is merely that Google’s search 
methodology tends to favor its own content and feature it prominently in response to 
certain search queries. 
¶74  Thus, the essential facility argument must be premised on the notions that the 
ranked results listing is itself the essential facility, and that the lack of access to a desired 
top ranking constitutes denial of access.  However, in that case, the “facility” is clearly 
not nonrivalrous.  There is only one first-ranked position, one second-ranked, and so on.  
Where a facility cannot accommodate both the monopolist-owner and its rival, the law is 
clear that the monopolist does not have to “share,” no matter how essential access may be 
to competition.  If there is no legal obligation to share in that situation, there would 
naturally be no need for the search engine to adopt a “neutral” standard for the allocation 
of the scarce resource—top-ranking.  Rather, the search engine has the right to use the 
non-sharable resource itself.   
 
185
 City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992). 
186
 City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1992). 
187
 City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1381 (“Edison’s reason for denying firm access was simply that when 
Northwest Power was available and inexpensive Edison was fully using its capacity to import that power 
into its whole system.”); City of Vernon, 955 F.2d at 1366 (“Vernon fails to demonstrate just why Edison is 
required to cease using its own facility so that Vernon can begin using it.  This is not a situation where 
Edison had no use for the facility and arbitrarily denied someone else its use.”). 
188
 City of Vernon, 955 F.2d at 1366; see also City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1381 (“It is a situation where 
Edison can use its own facility in full to obtain inexpensive power.  The Cities seem to contend that Edison 
has to disable itself so that they can get cheap power.  The law requires no such thing.”).  
189
 City of Vernon, 955 F.2d at 1367 (“Edison clearly had a use for its lines. . . .  [T]he demand that 
Edison turn over its facility to a city simply because the city could save money by obtaining cheaper power 
stands the essential facility doctrine on its head.”) (citing City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1381). 
190
 See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 161, at 12–13 (incorporating into the definition of an 
infrastructure—to which the essential facility doctrine could apply—the requirement that the resource is 
one that “may be consumed non-rivalrously,” that is, it is “sharable”);  Waller, supra note 76, at 373 
(same). 
191
 See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 161, at 12–13. 
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¶75  Thus, even accepting the argument that access to its top ranking for a slew of 
specific keywords is essential for competitive viability, Google has no legal obligation to 
give up its non-sharable property—the prime spot on its results page—to a competitor, 
regardless of which product (e.g. Google Maps, Mapquest or Bing Maps) is better by 
some “objective” metric.  Because rankings are inherently not nonrivalrous, invoking the 
essential facility principle in the context of search results seems incongruous. 
IV. UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL AND SACRIFICE OF PROFITS 
¶76  The essential facilities doctrine is basically a subset of the general antitrust duty to 
deal.  Even where no essential facility is involved, a monopolist’s unilateral “refusal to 
deal” with a competitor can give rise to liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act in 
exceptional circumstances.
192
  However, basing section 2 liability on pure unilateral 
refusals has always been somewhat controversial because it comes quite close to finding 
an antitrust violation for no-fault monopolization.
193
  Thus, just as with the essential 
facilities doctrine, the general duty to deal has been applied only sparingly.
194
  There are, 
in fact, few conceptual differences between the two antitrust principles, and antitrust 
commentators tend to merge or blend the discussion of these doctrines.
195
  A general duty 
to deal, not tied to an essential facility, is no more appropriate (or likely to be found 
applicable) for Google’s search rankings under Trinko than the essential facilities 
doctrine. 
A. Termination of Prior Profitable Relationship Evidencing Sacrifice of  
Short-Term Profits 
¶77  In Trinko, the most recent Supreme Court case involving a monopolist’s alleged 
duty to deal, a unanimous Supreme Court reiterated that “as a general matter, the 
Sherman Act ‘does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer 
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion 
as to parties with whom he will deal.’”196  In addition, the Court bluntly said that antitrust 
law disfavors the imposition of duties to deal because of concerns about their disincentive 
 
192
 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985) (“The high 
value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms does not mean that the right is 
unqualified.”). 
193
 Even earlier cases that took a more aggressive approach toward monopolization have implicitly 
rejected the notion of liability for no-fault monopolization.  See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (cautioning that a “single producer may be the survivor out of a group of 
active companies, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight, and industry. . . .  The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”). 
194
 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004) (“Under certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can constitute anticompetitive 
conduct and violate § 2.  We have been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions, however, because of 
the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive 
conduct by a single firm.”). 
195
 Perhaps one distinction is that courts have not tried to craft a systematic test for unilateral refusals to 
deal as they have for the essential facilities doctrine, but have tended to focus on the particular facts of a 
case, including the monopolist’s intent.  Compare Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585, with MCI Commc’ns Corp. 
v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
196
 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Colgate & 
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). 
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effect on investments and innovations.
197
  While Trinko did not repudiate Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., which found a section 2 violation based on a 
dominant firm’s unjustified refusal to deal with a competitor,198 it severely limited 
Aspen’s scope and described the case as being “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 
liability.”199 
¶78  Aspen involved a ski operator who, after becoming dominant in the relevant 
market,
200
 would not continue to join its rival in offering a highly popular and profitable 
joint multi-day, all-Aspen ski ticket.
201
  The operator also refused to sell its daily ski 
tickets—an item it normally sold to the public—in bulk to the competitor, even at the full 
retail price, so as to prevent the competitor from cobbling together an alternative to the 
terminated joint ticket.
202
  The Court concluded that the jury could infer anticompetitive 
intent from the defendant’s willingness to sacrifice short-term profits by terminating a 
profitable prior relationship with its rival.
203
   
¶79  The Trinko Court construed Aspen very narrowly, limiting it to its facts.  It read 
Aspen’s imposition of a duty to deal as hinging on the monopolist’s termination of a 
preexisting profitable course of dealing with its rival, which evidenced a “willingness to 
forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”204  The theory is that a 
monopolist’s voluntary sacrifice of short-term profits makes no economic sense and 
suggests “a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be higher,”205 which 
could justify an exception to the general no duty to deal rule.  Accordingly, the Court 
suggested that, before unilateral refusals can give rise to section 2 liability, there must 
usually be a prior profitable business relationship between the monopolist and its 




 Id. at 407–08. 
198
 472 U.S. 585. 
199
 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
200
 The defendant Ski Co. initially owned only one of the four ski mountain facilities in Aspen but later 
(through acquisitions) owned three.  For some reason, it did not appeal the lower court’s definition of the 
relevant market as consisting of downhill skiing in Aspen.  Under this definition, ski resorts outside of 
Aspen were excluded, which allowed Ski Co. to be characterized as a monopolist.  A good argument could 
have been made that the relevant geographic market should not have been so limited because skiers 
dissatisfied with the offerings in Aspen could easily visit ski resorts elsewhere.  However, because the 
defendant did not appeal the market definition and the finding of market power, the only issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the defendant’s unilateral refusal to deal satisfied the conduct element of 
section 2. 
201
 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985) (“[T]he monopolist elected to make an important change in a 
pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several years.”). 
202
 The joint multi-day ski ticket was popular with skiers because it allowed them to ski on all four ski 
mountains in Aspen (three owned by defendant and one by plaintiff) over a period of days.  When it was 
discontinued because of the defendant’s refusal to deal, the plaintiff tried to purchase daily tickets for 
defendant’s ski mountains in order to include them in a ski package with daily tickets for its own mountain, 
as a substitute for the terminated popular joint ticket.  See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589, 593–94. 
203
 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608 (noting that the jury could have concluded from defendant’s refusal to 
make profitable sales of tickets to plaintiff that it “elected to forego these short-run benefits because it was 
more interested in reducing competition in the Aspen market over the long run by harming its smaller 
competitor”); id. at 610–11 (“Thus the evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by 
efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in 
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”). 
204
 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (commenting on Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 585 (1985)).  
205
 Id. 
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¶80  These conditions cannot be satisfied in the context of Google’s favoring its own 
content and services in returning relevant search results.  No search engine can 
reasonably be said to have a prior course of dealing with a firm based on the fact that its 
algorithm has previously returned a link to the firm’s webpage in response to a search 
query.  A search engine generates results for millions upon millions of search queries 
every day.  To view it as having a preexisting business relationship with every entity 
whose website link has been automatically included in a results page, free of charge, goes 
beyond the general understanding of the concept of a business relationship or course of 
dealing.  
¶81  But even if a website’s previous top ranking in various search results could be 
characterized as a prior course of dealing with a search engine, subsequent “termination” 
of the relationship by the search engine (by taking the top rank for itself) does not require 
the search engine to sacrifice short-term profits.  Google, like Bing and Yahoo!, does not 
charge websites any fees when its algorithm returns a link to them and, therefore, 
“termination” of the “relationship” does not cost Google lost profits.  Nor is there 
evidence that by giving preference to its own content, Google has suffered a drop in its 
advertising revenues.  Stated differently, even if Google or Bing can be said to have 
terminated a prior course of dealing with Mapquest when it started returning its own 
maps instead of a first-ranked link to Mapquest, this “termination” does not entail any 
sacrifice of short-term profits for the search engine.  Nor can the “termination” be 
considered economically irrational but for the exclusionary effect it would have on 
Mapquest.  Thus, the Aspen factors that Trinko seems to require are absent, and it is 
difficult to envision a court applying an Aspen-like duty to deal in connection with 
Google’s search rankings. 
B. Lorain Journal? 
¶82  Notably, in its Trinko decision, the Court made no reference to Lorain Journal Co. 
v. United States,
206
 a 1951 case relied upon by the Aspen Court to find the existence of a 
duty to deal.
207
  Given that Trinko arguably left Lorain Journal untouched, it is necessary 
to consider whether there are parallels between Google’s preference for its own content 
and the defendant’s conduct in Lorain Journal that could justify applying Lorain 
Journal’s rationale to Google search to find antitrust liability.   
¶83  In Lorain Journal, the Court found a section 2 violation where the sole newspaper 
serving the area refused to accept advertisements from businesses that also advertised or 
planned to advertise on a newly established radio station, the area’s only other 
disseminator of news and advertising.
208
  The publisher’s objective was to “cut off [the 
radio station’s] bloodstream of existence—the advertising revenues,”209 in order to regain 
its monopoly in the dissemination of news and advertising in the area.
210
  To execute its 
plan, the newspaper monitored the radio station’s broadcasts to identify its advertisers, 
 
206
 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
207
 Aspen Skiing 472 U.S. at 601–03. 
208
 Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 146–49. 
209
 Id. at 149. 
210
 Id. at 151 (“[T]he publisher’s attempt to destroy WEOL was in fact an attempt to end the invasion by 
radio of the Lorain newspaper’s monopoly” of the mass dissemination of local news and advertising in 
Lorain). 
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then terminated their advertising contracts and would only renew them after the 
advertisers ceased advertising on the radio.
211
 
¶84  While Lorain Journal is usually considered a unilateral refusal to deal case—
standing for the proposition that a monopolist’s right to choose with whom it will do 
business is not unqualified
212—the case, in fact, was not about a pure unilateral refusal.  
Rather, it involved exclusive dealing, or a conditional refusal.  The monopolist 
publisher’s willingness to do business with its advertising customers was contingent on 
their agreement to exclusivity.  This conduct, specifically aimed at the “complete 
destruction and elimination” of the radio station,213 is qualitatively very different from a 
dominant search engine simply favoring its own products and services over that of its 
competitors in its display of search results.  To be comparable to Lorain Journal, there 
would have to be a particular unjustified act or condition aimed at excluding competition, 
such as Google specifically demoting a website as a penalty for advertising on Bing or 
Yahoo!, for soliciting an advertiser for its own website in competition with Google, for 
refusing to purchase advertising on Google, or for otherwise presenting a competitive 
threat.  Absent such specific acts of exclusion, Google’s choice to display its own 
property more prominently in search results bears little resemblance to Lorain Journal.
214
 
V. THE COMPENSATION CONUNDRUM 
¶85  There are other problematic issues common to both the general duty to deal and the 
essential facilities doctrine as possible legal tools for mandating search “neutrality.”  
Preliminarily, it is extremely difficult to determine what a truly “neutral” result would 
be
215
 and who would (and should) have the right to make that qualitative judgment.
216
  
Even if we can somehow sort out these complex issues, it is important to note that 
compulsory access does not mean free access.
217
  Courts have never ordered a 
monopolist-defendant to grant uncompensated access or provide free assistance to a rival 
in a pure essential facility or duty to deal case.  Indeed, no case has even held that any 
compensated dealing must be at the competitive price.
218
  That mandatory access does not 
 
211
 Id. at 149. 
212
 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 601–02 (describing Lorain Journal as squarely holding that the 
important right of a firm not to deal with other firms is not unqualified). 
213
 Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 150. 
214
 In any event, whatever the vitality of Lorain Journal, it seems hard to apply to Google because 
favoring its own property in the display of search results cannot really be characterized as refusing to deal 
with others. 
215
 See Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, supra note 42, at 443–45 (disputing 
the notion that search queries can have objectively right and wrong answers and explaining that search 
itself is subjective). 
216
 See Volokh & Falk, supra note 65 (making the case that search engine results reflect a search 
engine’s editorial judgment of relevant content that is fully protected by the First Amendment). 
217
 Even those who advocate revitalizing the essential facilities doctrine have emphasized this point.  See 
Frischmann & Waller, supra note 161, at 11 (“[Open access] does not mean that access is free.”).  
218
 The Supreme Court recently held that an upstream monopolist with no duty to deal is free to charge 
whatever wholesale price it wishes to a competitor in the retail market, but did not say whether the 
monopolist would have the same discretion if it had a duty to deal with the retail competitor.  Pac. Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).  However, given that the Sherman Act generally 
allows a monopolist to charge monopoly prices, there is no logical argument why a monopolist that is 
vertically integrated would not be permitted to sell its input or make available its resource at the wholesale 
level at a monopoly price as well. 
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mean free access is also implicit in cases cautioning that courts should not be thrust into a 
role requiring them to determine prices at which the forced sharing must take place.
219
  In 
fact, the difficulty of setting prices to ensure just compensation to the monopolist for 
granting access is one reason for the general judicial reluctance to order compulsory 
access in the first place.
220
 
¶86  Though the issue has not been explicitly addressed, the notion that mandated 
dealings require compensation for the monopolist seems correct as a matter of private 
property right.  The freedom to choose with whom one wishes to do business or not do 
business is associated with the right to exclude, which is a property right.
221
  Mandated 
access necessarily involves a compromise of the monopolist’s exclusive property rights.  
Therefore, to be consistent with private property rights, not even a monopolist should 
generally be required to permit an uncompensated intrusion on its property right—its 
right to exclude—for the greater good of facilitating competition.222   
¶87  To the extent that compulsory dealing requires compensation to the monopolist, it 
is difficult to see how courts can mandate access in terms of search results.  A search 
engine cannot be compelled to offer its competitors access to the choice locations on its 
results pages without reasonable compensation.  At the same time, under Google’s 
business model, web publishers are not charged if the search algorithm returns links to 
their websites in response to any search query.  It seems unlikely that any firm would (or 
should) be ordered to alter its business model—in the case of search engines, to take 
payment for ranking a particular rival site in the organic results (assuming that it is even 
possible to determine fair compensation)—just to facilitate compulsory dealing.  This 
compensation conundrum further highlights the incongruity of the duty to deal and 
essential facility paradigms in the context of search. 
VI. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS AND LEGITIMATE JUSTIFICATIONS? 
¶88  Those who advocate prohibiting Google from displaying specialized search results 
seem to assume that a practice that happens to be in Google’s self-interest is necessarily 
anticompetitive.  However, as some commentators have suggested, that assumption does 
not seem valid.
223
  Google is often faulted for having dislodged the previously dominant 
 
219
 See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (stating, as a reason for severely limiting the duty to deal, the fact 
that courts are not suited to determine the proper price for any forced sharing); Deborah A. Garza et al., 
Antitrust Modernization Comm’n Report and Recommendations 102 (2007), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (“[F]orced sharing 
requires courts to determine the price at which such sharing must take place, thereby transforming antitrust 
courts into price regulators, a role for which they are ill suited.”). 
220
 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (“Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central 
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill 
suited.”). 
221
 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (holding that the government could not 
require owners of a marina to make it open to the public without compensating the owners, based on a 
property right analysis). 
222
 See Robinson, supra note 76, at 1192 (analogizing mandatory dealing to “a private power of eminent 
domain”).  But see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm, 54 
DUKE L.J. 1, 80–83 (2004) (arguing that the property right to exclude is not as absolute as it is often 
claimed to be and cataloguing the limits on property rights). 
223
 See generally Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, supra note 42, at 450–52 
(giving examples of Google’s ranking decisions that are both in its self-interest and also benefit users); 
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Mapquest and Yahoo! Maps when it “put its own [map] service atop all others for generic 
address searches.”224  Yet Google Maps has been praised as “groundbreaking when 
launched” and an “astonishingly clever” service.225  Moreover, when a search engine 
automatically returns its map when it surmises from a query that a user would like to see 
a map, it benefits most users by directly providing them the information that they 
probably need instead of linking them to another site where they must enter another 
query.  Because a practice that is good for Google can also enhance consumer welfare, it 
is important not to short-circuit the competitive effects analysis, which should focus on 
the effects on consumers and not on competitors.   
¶89  In order to find antitrust liability under the rule of reason, a court must find that a 
business practice alleged to be exclusionary has anticompetitive effects that are not 
outweighed by its procompetitive benefits.
226
  The standard economic theory of harm for 
unilateral refusals is foreclosure: the exclusion of competition, usually in a downstream 
market, to the detriment of consumers.
227
  In the context of search, the basic foreclosure 
argument seems to be that Google’s favoring of its own content and services would 
deprive competing vertical providers of user traffic, diminish their sales and advertising 
revenues, and impair their product development.
228
  Kayak and Expedia, for example, 
have contended that if Google favors its own travel products, they would have to turn to 
less efficient alternatives to reach consumers, hampering their ability to compete 
effectively with Google in travel search.
229
  To the extent that the highest-ranked search 
result usually receives substantially more clicks than the second-ranked, which receives 
more clicks than the third-ranked and so on,
230
 failure to place at the top of the search 
results would likely result in some foreclosure.   
 
Crane, supra note 3, at 5–6 (approving of universal search results and the need for search engines to have 
the freedom to make strategic choices regarding embedding additional functions in their search engines that 
were formerly performed by external websites). 
224
 See TRAFFIC REPORT, supra note 52, at 5. 
225
 See Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, supra note 42, at 452.  See also John 
Carroll, Google Maps and Innovation, ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/carroll/google-
maps-and-innovation/1499 (lauding Google Maps). 
226
 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(“[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ . . .  [I]f a 
plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under § 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then 
the monopolist may proffer a [nonpretextual] ‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct. . . .  [I]f the 
monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”). 
227
 See Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago 
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 514 (1995) (discussing the foreclosure issue raised by vertical integration). 
228
 See, e.g., Hearing on the Power of Google, supra note 107, at 13 (Statement of Thomas O. Barnett) 
(“Google’s tactics foreclose the ability of other sites to compete on the merits and to achieve the scale 
necessary to succeed.  Without search traffic and the resulting revenues, these sites are unable to deliver 
innovative content and better services to consumers.  Further, websites and content creators often must 
spend more money on paid search advertising to offset in part their loss of visibility, taking away further 
resources from investment in innovation.”). 
229
 See Margot Williams, Expedia is Worried About Google/ITA Deal, INSIDEGOOGLE (July 12, 2010, 
12:13 PM), http://insidegoogle.com/2010/07/expedia-is-worried-about-googleita-deal/.  See also Ashby 
Jones, The Google/Antitrust Story Continues With Objections to ITA Purchase, WSJ LAW BLOG (Oct. 26, 
2010, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/10/26/the-googleantitrust-story-continues-with-objections-
to-ita-purchase/.  
230
 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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¶90  However, it is doubtful that there would be substantial foreclosure, which is 
required for antitrust liability.
231
  As discussed above, businesses have other reasonable 
options for reaching potential customers.  In fact, for the top thirty websites, which 
include many of Google’s competitors in ancillary markets (such as Kayak, Yelp, 
Amazon, eBay, Expedia, Travelocity and Priceline), a study shows that these websites 
rely on Google for only 16% of their user traffic.
232
  This suggests that, while access to 
the most desirable space on a results page is obviously desirable, and the lack of access 
may have some foreclosure effect, the effect is not sufficiently substantial to raise 
antitrust concerns. 
¶91  Furthermore, antitrust law is consumer-centric—it protects “competition, not 
competitors,”233 which means that our focus must be on the impact of Google’s practice 
of favoring its own services on search users, not on competing websites.  The practice 
would not be anticompetitive if it is good for search users even if it also happens to 
benefit Google.
234
  An example given by Professor James Grimmelmann involving 
Foundem and some price-comparison sites is instructive in this regard.  Grimmelmann 
argues that many of these sites are “worthless” and “junk,” and that a ranking system that 
incorporates a penalty for them would be a service to most users.
235
  Since Google also 
offers product searches, such a penalty on some price-comparison sites might incidentally 
give it some competitive advantage.  In other words, a practice that could improve 
Google’s position vis-à-vis a competitor may also be pro-competitive. 
¶92  Similarly, the use of universal search results, which effectively favors the search 
engine’s own content and services, cannot be presumed anticompetitive simply because it 
may adversely affect some rival content providers.  When Google integrates its own 
proprietary content into the search results along with the traditional blue links, it probably 
does reduce user traffic to the sites of its competitors in those vertical markets.  However, 
commentators seem to agree that the introduction of universal search is a beneficial 
phenomenon.
236
  Viewed from the perspective of search users and not rival websites, the 
 
231
 Usually, foreclosure of at least 40% of the relevant market is required for antitrust liability but a 
lower percentage can suffice where competitors were prevented from achieving the critical mass needed to 
pose a threat to the monopolist.  See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and 
Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 324 n.85 (2002) (listing decisions illustrating use of the 40% 
threshold). 
232
 See CITIGROUP, INC., supra note 165. 
233
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (quoted by Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)). 
234
 See FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1 (acknowledging that Google’s 
algorithm and design changes may weaken Google’s vertical competitors but “could reasonably be viewed 
as improving the overall quality of Google’s search results”). 
235
 See Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, supra note 42, at 450 (using examples 
to explain why applying penalties to reduce many vertical search sites’ rankings is beneficial to users).  
Grimmelmann is widely acknowledged to be a technologically savvy commentator, due to his significant 
prior experience in the computer industry.  See James Grimmelmann, NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty_profiles/james_grimmelmann (last visited April 12, 2013).  
236
 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 3; Wingfield, supra note 121 (commenting favorably on the 
Bing/Facebook alliance which would allow Bing to integrate data from Facebook into its search results); 
Ryan Singel, Times Case for Gov Regulation of Google Search Is Weak, WIRED.COM (Jul. 16, 2010, 3:35 
PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2010/07/nyt-google-regulation/ (“Clearly, the map is useful to 
searchers, who’d much rather see a map than a link to one.  While that might be bad for Mapquest’s 
business, it’s not bad for users . . . . Microsoft’s Bing and Yahoo are doing similar things, and are going 
even beyond that.  Search on a music artist on Yahoo and you get an information box, with a bio, a picture 
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inclusion of maps and local results, for example, is almost certainly positive since it helps 
users get the information that they are seeking more directly and efficiently.  
¶93  To the extent that some content integration may not be as obviously beneficial, it is 
reasonable to be concerned that Google might indiscriminately prefer its own content in a 
way that degrades its search results, to the detriment of consumers.  One factor, however, 
is likely to weigh against this possibility: Google’s dependence on search-based 
advertisements.  Google does not presently sell retail goods or services, or receive fees 
from websites to which it directs user traffic.  Nor does it receive commissions based on 
its product search offerings, unlike many comparison-shopping sites.
237
  Because Google 
depends primarily on search-based advertising for its profitability and a large user base 
attracts advertisements, increasing or retaining its user base is critical to Google’s 
success.
238
  To protect and expand its user base in the face of intense competition from 
other general search engines, Facebook, and other portals of online information all vying 
for consumer attention, Google must continually anticipate user expectations in its search 
results and other offerings.   
¶94  If Google degraded its search results by deliberately omitting or demoting quality 
websites simply because they compete with Google in various market segments, it would 
risk losing users to other search engines and to non-general search engine competitors.
239
  
A loss of user base would likely mean a loss of advertising revenue.  Google’s market 
incentives, therefore, are to satisfy and exceed user expectations, which should help 
counterbalance whatever self-interested motivations Google might otherwise have to 
promote its own services over its competitors regardless of their impact on user 
experience.  In fact, in closing its investigation of Google, the FTC cited evidence that 
showed Google demoted its own content when market tests revealed that a higher ranking 
detracted from the user experience.
240
 
¶95  There is also evidence that the movement toward universal search results and other 
integration of (or interfacing with) a search engine’s own services represents the search 
engine’s competitive strategy.241  These strategies are employed, not only by Google, but 
also by Bing and Yahoo!.
242
  Since neither Bing nor Yahoo! has sufficient share of the 
 
and links to songs you can stream. . . .  While that may reduce the traffic to a band . . . it’s hard to argue 
that’s anti-competitive or a disservice to users.”). 
237
 See Singel, supra note 236 (“Google doesn’t make its money from referring traffic to websites the 
way that say the shopping search engine TheFind does.”). 
238
 Evans, supra note 114, at manuscript 4–6 (explaining strategies for increasing value for multi-sided 
platforms, which include the search engine).  
239
 See Singel, supra note 236 (“The better the real results, the more often users will come back in the 
long run and the more likely that in one of their searches, they decide to click the ads, instead of a link . . . .  
That means rigging your algorithm is the worst thing a search engine can do and would be the fastest way 
to lose users to a competing search engine.”). 
240
 See FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1 (“For example, 
contemporaneous evidence demonstrates that Google would typically test, monitor, and carefully consider 
the effect of introducing its own vertical content on the quality of its general search results, and would 
demote its own content to a less prominent location when a higher ranking adversely affected the user 
experience.”). 
241
 See Wright, supra note 3, at 47 (concluding from his empirical study that search bias “emerged as an 
efficient competitive strategy, allowing search engines to differentiate their products in ways that benefit 
consumers”). 
242
 See id. (showing, in his study, that the absolute level of search engine “bias” was extremely low, but 
to the extent that it existed, it was seen more frequently in Bing search results than in Google); Benjamin 
Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Jan. 19, 
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search traffic to exercise market power, it is generally safe to assume that the practice is 
more likely an effective form of competition than an anticompetitive strategy.
243
  
¶96  If the trend toward universal search results is primarily a manifestation of search 
engine evolution and competition,
244
 it would mean that the practice is supported by a 
legitimate business justification.  It is clear from Aspen and earlier cases that competitive 
justifications excuse unilateral refusals to deal.
245
  In fact, Aspen suggests that if a 
legitimate business justification exists, a refusal is deemed to be appropriate without the 
need to balance its competitive effects.
246
  The law on essential facility seems to be the 
same with respect to this issue.
247
   
¶97  Given the rapid pace at which the online information sector evolves, it seems 
unlikely that Google can afford to be complacent.  The broad Internet market in which 
Google competes is one that experiences what economist Joseph Schumpeter famously 
referred to as the “perennial gales of creative destruction” that blow through our economy 
benefiting society.
248
  In this highly dynamic environment, change is a constant, and new 
technologies continually emerge changing the competitive landscape.
249
  Well-known 
specialized websites such as Amazon and Kayak, for example, now have powerful search 
capabilities, and Amazon, in particular, is hardly just a large web store.
250
  Facebook is 
gaining on Google as the online destination for users, and some have predicted that its 
 
2011), http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/ (showing, through a study, that both Yahoo and Google 
engage in some search bias); Singel, supra note 236 (giving examples of Microsoft’s Bing and Yahoo! 
apparently going beyond what Google does, and finding that it’s hard to argue that it is bad for users).  
243
 See FTC Statement Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 1 (“We also note that other 
competing general search engines adopted many similar design changes, suggesting that these changes are 
a quality improvement with no necessary connection to the anticompetitive exclusion of rivals.”). 
244
 See Wright, supra note 3, at 46 (concluding, from his study of search bias, that search engines’ 
favoring of their own content is driven by “the evolution of consumer preferences for more sophisticated 
and useful search results”). 
245
 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604–05, 608–10 (1985) 
(suggesting that the refusal would not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act had there been non-pretextual 
business reasons for the refusal); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 483 n.32 
(1992) (observing that a monopolist may refuse to deal with its rivals “if there are legitimate competitive 
reasons for the refusal”). 
246
 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608.  The Supreme Court in Aspen did not call for any balancing of the 
competitive gains from a refusal to deal against the anticompetitive losses; rather it suggested that had 
Aspen Skiing’s proffered business justifications not been pretextual, no liability would have arisen from its 
refusal to deal.     
247
 See, e.g., Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004); City of 
Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[The monopolist] could still deny 
access if it had legitimate business reasons for that denial.”); City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 
F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff ultimately has the burden of proving that the 
defendant’s refusal to share access was without a legitimate business justification); United Asset Coverage, 
Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  See also MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T 
Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) (implying that there would be no liability had AT&T’s proffered 
business justification for refusing to provide interconnection to its facility been non-pretextual); Areeda, 
supra note 77, at 852 (arguing that “legitimate business purpose always saves the defendant” and that, once 
the defendant comes forward with a legitimate business purpose, the burden is on the plaintiff to overcome 
the claim). 
248
 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1942).  
249
 See Farhad Manjoo, The Great Tech War of 2012: Apple, Facebook, Google, and Amazon Battle for 
the Future of the Innovation Economy, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 2011, 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/160/tech-wars-2012-amazon-apple-google-facebook. 
250
 See id. (naming Amazon as one of the four large companies that “don’t recognize any borders” and 
“encroach further and further into one another’s space”). 
Vol. 11:5] Marina Lao 
 313 
network could replace Google as the search engine and navigator for its community of 
users.
251
  And smartphones have moved users towards more mobile-app-centric Internet 
consumption rather than a web approach to the Internet.
252
   
¶98  One would expect general search engines (including Google), faced with intense 
competition on various fronts, to evolve and innovate in order to remain competitive.  
This trend supports the assertion that the search engine evolution—from a pure search 
tool to merging content into search—is primarily a competitive strategy designed to 
satisfy consumer desires to have the most relevant information presented quickly and in a 
user-friendly format.
253
   If that is the case, the practice of a search engine favoring its 
own content in search results would be supported by a legitimate business justification.
254
 
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
¶99  The above discussion has highlighted the doctrinal incongruity of juxtaposing 
essential facility and the antitrust duty to deal in the context of search rankings.  It is also 
worth considering whether policy concerns might tilt in favor of a broader construction of 
these doctrines.  I do not believe they do.  To the contrary, policy considerations seem to 
further strengthen the case for the current restrictive approach. 
A. Incentives to Innovate and Invest as a Macro Policy Rationale 
¶100  The usual macro argument in favor of strictly limiting the duty to deal and the 
essential facilities doctrine is that mandated dealings with rivals would decrease the 
incentives for investment and innovation.
 255
  In Trinko, the Supreme Court voiced those 
concerns, saying: 
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders 
them uniquely suited to serve their customers.  Compelling such firms to share 
the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of 
 
251
 See Farhad Manjoo, Why Facebook Will Will, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 2011, 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/160/why-facebook-will-win  (“The promise of Facebook lies in its 
servers, in the data it collects about how we interact with one another and with brands. . . . Facebook now 
boasts more than 800 million users around the world.  More than half of them log in every single day, and 
more than 2 million posts a day are liked and commented upon.”); see also supra notes 119–22 and 
accompanying text. 
252
 See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
253
 This is an assertion that all search engines have made.  See, e.g., Greg Sterling, Yahoo: We’re Moving 
From Web of Pages to Web of Objects, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 19, 2009), 
http://searchengineland.com/yahoo-were-moving-from-web-of-pages-to-web-of-objects-19524 (explaining 
Yahoo!’s move beyond ten blue links as “more closely aligning user intent with search results and mapping 
those to real-world tasks”). 
254
 See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
255
 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004); 
see also R. Hewitt Pate, Refusals to Deal and Essential Facilities, Testimony Submitted to DOJ/FTC 
Hearings on Single Firm Conduct, Jul. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/218649.htm (asserting that “the fact that the 
defendant has a highly valued facility is a reason to reject sharing, not to require it,” because compulsory 
sharing will reduce incentives to invest). 
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antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or 
both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.
256
 
¶101  The theory underlying this argument is that compelling a monopolist to share its 
advantage with a rival would prevent it from fully appropriating the rewards of its 
investment, leading the monopolist to reduce its investment, and resulting in less 
innovation.
257
  The rival, assured of access to the source of the monopolist’s advantage, 
would be less motivated to find a creative alternative to it.
258
  Additionally, the 
knowledge that they may not be able to reap the full rewards of their investment might 
adversely affect investors’ willingness to invest and innovate in the future. 259 
¶102  These incentive concerns, though widely accepted, seem overstated.  It is difficult 
to know the actual long-term economic effect of placing some limitations on a 
monopolist’s reward through the imposition of a duty to deal in limited circumstances.260  
While reducing returns on investment in innovation through compulsory sharing may 
reduce future investments at the margins, economic analysis cannot tell us how much less 
investment and whether it would actually decrease useful innovation.  Moreover, 
mandatory sharing may unleash innovation and competition from rivals in the 
downstream market, which ought to be taken into account in the calculus of the total 
effects of compulsory access on innovation.  Economic analysis, no matter how rigorous, 
is probably inadequate to make these assessments.
261
  Therefore, I am somewhat skeptical 
of incentive effects as a macro policy rationale against compulsory access. 
B. The Risk of Freezing Search Evolution and Innovation and Distorting Competition 
¶103  In the specific instance of search engines, however, imposing search “neutrality” 
may actually impede their organic growth, rather than merely reduce incentives to 
innovate in an abstract sense.  In the search context, “sharing access” probably means that 
a search engine would have to find a neutral way to determine whose content—its own or 
a competitor’s—should be provided or ranked first on the results page.  However, if a 
search engine has to make that determination before returning a map, for example, in 
search results in response to a query suggesting that the user might be interested in one, 
probably no map will be included.  Moreover, no universal search results would likely be 
 
256
 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–08. 
257
 See Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals to Deal In Intellectual and Other Property, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 380 (2009) (“In discussions of why refusals to deal should be legal, courts and 
commentators usually emphasize the potential deterrent effect of mandatory dealing on the investment 
incentives of the would-be defendant and of all others who would see imposition of liability as a signal of 
what might await them should their business succeed too well.”). 
258
 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Every time the 
monopolist asserts its market dominance” by refusing to grant access to a resource to its competitor, that 
competitor “has more incentive to find an alternative supplier, which in turn gives alternate suppliers more 
reason to think that they can compete with the monopolist.”). 
259
 Shelanski, supra note 257.  
260
 Id. at 381–82 (explaining that there may be cases where mandatory dealing would not interfere with 
investment incentives and where imposing liability for unilateral refusal to deal would not be economically 
harmful). 
261
 See id.  at 394 (“Because the path of innovation is likely much harder to predict than short-term 
changes in price and output levels, it will be impossible in most cases definitively to calculate the 
comparative static and dynamic welfare effects of economic conduct.”). 
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offered, effectively freezing the natural growth and the contours of a general search 
engine.
262
  It is difficult to see how that result would benefit users. 
¶104  In the early days of Google, search and content were clearly distinct, and the role of 
a general search engine was to simply apply its algorithm to millions of websites to 
generate a list of results deemed most responsive to the search query: the so-called ten 
blue links.  But it makes sense for general search engines to apply and extend their 
expertise into specialized search.  Once they do, it makes sense for them to integrate 
those specialized results or content into the general search results, especially when that is 
what users apparently want.
263
  Not allowing general search engines to make these 
strategic choices would effectively lock them in a dated vision of search and freeze the 
search engine evolution.
264
  While this would benefit Google’s competitors in vertical 
markets, it would almost certainly be a negative development for users. 
¶105  Moreover, limiting search engines to their original contours would distort 
competition.  In a world where the various portals of online information are morphing 
and redefining themselves,
265
 no one—probably not even Google and the other 
significant players—knows how this industry will evolve and what it will look like in a 
few years.  At this time, there is fierce competition among Google, Facebook, Apple, and 
Amazon.
266
  Preventing general search engines from organically transforming 
themselves, as other online information sectors are doing, would artificially interfere with 
the natural process of competition that is presently occurring.  
¶106  Some might argue that application of essential facilities or the duty to deal to 
impose search “neutrality” would not, in fact, obstruct the search engine evolution 
because these principles can only possibly be applied against Google, the dominant 
general search provider.
267
  The other major search engines, notably Bing and Yahoo!, do 
not have sufficient share of the general search traffic to expose them to section 2 liability, 
regardless of how narrowly the market may be defined.
268
  Thus, they would remain free 
to design their search services as they see fit, including embedding their own content into 
the search results.  In other words, only Google, by virtue of its dominance among 
 
262
 Crane, supra note 3, at 5–6 (giving examples of universal search results and arguing that disallowing 
them would freeze the evolution of the search engine).  
263
 See, e.g., Shashi Seth, A New Era of Search is About the Answers, Not Just the Links, TECHCRUNCH 
(May 7, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/07/search-answers-not-just-links/ (quoting a Yahoo! 
executive who observed that users want to be able to get the answers they need without having “to interact 
with a page of traditional blue links”); Singel, supra note 236 (“[T]he whole industry is moving away from 
what it now dismisses as ‘10 blue links’—with the goal of providing answers to user queries instead of 
straight search results.”). 
264
 Crane, supra note 3, at 6 (“Unless the search engine is to remain stuck in the ten blue links paradigm, 
search engine companies must have the freedom to make strategic choices about the design of their 
services, including the decision to embed proprietary functions traditionally performed by websites in the 
engine’s search properties.”). 
265
 See Manjoo, supra note 249 (describing how the four major American companies that have come to 
define the information world—Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—are increasingly moving beyond 
their borders and encroaching into one another’s space). 
266
 See id. (detailing some of the initiatives of each of the four companies and how these initiatives 
compete against those of the other three firms). 
267
 The first element of the offense of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act requires proof 
of possession of monopoly power in the relevant market.  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
570–71 (1966). 
268
 Bing and Yahoo! handle approximately 15 percent and 14 percent, respectively, of the general search 
traffic in the United States.  See Whittaker, supra note 93 (citing comScore data).  
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general search engines, would be subject to a special obligation to “evolve” in a neutral 
manner even if the essential facilities doctrine or the general duty to deal were to apply in 
the search context. 
¶107  Such a “solution,” however, would present its own set of problems.  It would lock 
only Google into place in the development of search engines while allowing Microsoft’s 
Bing, Yahoo!, and other rivals to improve and adapt to the changing competitive 
environment.  While dominant firms are sometimes held to a different antitrust standard 
than their smaller rivals,
269
 antitrust law has long recognized that even monopolists 
“should be free to compete like everyone else.”270  Indeed, “[a] monopolist, no less than 
any other competitor, is permitted and . . . encouraged to compete aggressively on the 
merits.”271  In a rapidly changing Internet world where dominance can evaporate in an 
instant,
272
 a selective handicapping of the firm with current dominance in this manner 
would be troubling.  Preventing Google from innovating and adding features similar to 
those provided by other major general search engines, which users apparently want, 
seems to be poor antitrust policy. 
¶108  That a search engine should be allowed to favor its own content does not mean that 
no conduct relating to search rankings could or should be condemned under antitrust law.  
A distinction should be drawn between a simple preference for one’s own products and 
services, on the one hand, and unjustified affirmative conduct to block the competitive 
process, on the other.  The former merely reflects efforts by an integrated firm to derive 
the competitive benefits that flow from being in different productive activities.  It is not, 
in and of itself, an unlawful exercise of monopoly power
273
 that should be prohibited. 
¶109  The latter is more comparable to Lorain Journal, discussed above,274 and to the 
well-known United States v. Microsoft Corp. case.
275
  Microsoft had affirmatively and 
aggressively prohibited computer makers from installing a browser (Netscape Navigator) 
that competed against Microsoft Explorer, and took steps to block the competing browser 
from being distributed through Internet service providers and independent software 
vendors.
276
  In the case of Java, Microsoft reconfigured the Windows version of the 
program to create incompatibility and deceived Java developers about it, causing them to 
create programs that could only run on the Windows version of Java.
277
  Those were 
 
269
 For example, unilateral acts by a firm without monopoly power can never constitute an antitrust 
violation whereas a similar act by a monopolist that has the effect of unreasonably excluding competition 
could give rise to liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
270
 Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004) (cautioning against 
lessening a monopolist’s incentive to innovate by compelling them to share their competitive advantage 
with rivals). 
271
 Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544 (9th Cir. 1983).  
272
 See Manjoo, supra note 249 (“[T]he best tech companies stay at their peak for a decade tops,” though 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google may be different because they have shown “competitive 
excellence, strategic genius, and superb execution.”). 
273
 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that it 
is not unlawful for integrated firms to seek the efficiencies and other competitive benefits that accrue to 
them because of their involvement in several fields).  
274
 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); see also supra notes 206–14 and 
accompanying text. 
275
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
276
 Id. at 60–61. 
277
 Id. at 74–77. 
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affirmative acts that sought to interfere with the competitive process, and the court 
correctly found them to be exclusionary.
278
 
¶110  Giving priority to a search engine’s own proprietary content in the presentation of 
search results is quite different because it does not affirmatively thwart a competitor’s 
efforts to compete.  It would be a different matter if Google, for example, made an 
algorithm change specifically to demote a website’s ranking in retaliation for its buying 
advertisements on other search engines or Facebook, for soliciting advertisers for its 
website in competition with Google, for refusing to buy advertisements from Google, or 
simply for being a competitive threat.  In that case, its conduct would go beyond the 
simple preference for one’s own property and would more closely parallel the conduct at 
issue in Lorain Journal or Microsoft. 
C. “Big is Bad”? 
¶111  One final policy consideration is Google’s absolute size.  While modern antitrust 
law does not target “bigness,” there has historically been some fear of an excessive 
concentration of economic power, which could also lead to undue political influence.
279
  
It seems that some of the antitrust focus on Google may be driven in part by these 
unspoken sentiments.  The concern may be that, even if Google is not acting to exclude 
competition and may not even have monopoly power in an antitrust sense, its size and 
skill alone could crush competitors if nothing is done to clip its wings.   
¶112  If fear of Google’s absolute size and its having a hand in too many businesses is the 
true impetus behind various proposals to regulate Google, then there should be more 
comprehensive and thoughtful consideration of the nuances and implications of pursuing 
such a course of action.  Google is big, but so are Facebook, Apple and Amazon.
280
  If we 
are concerned with Google becoming an information monopolist in a generic non-
antitrust sense of the word monopolist, we should probably be equally concerned with the 
other information monopolists and their straying outside of their original sectors.
281
  
However, if we limit the freedom of these dynamic firms to innovate across the 
information economy due to fears of excessive concentration of economic power, what 
would be the efficiency and innovation tradeoffs?   
¶113  Given that these companies are currently among the most innovative and successful 
in our economy, those concerned about firm size should seriously consider whether the 
dangers that might be associated with bigness are sufficiently acute to compel courts and 
antitrust enforcers to interfere with their organic growth, absent affirmative exclusionary 
conduct.  In markets characterized by constant technological upheaval, there is 
considerably less reason to fear absolute size since there is not much correlation between 
size and staying power.  As an example, as recently as 2000, AOL was widely viewed as 
 
278
 Id. at 61–62, 65–66, 76. 
279
 See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934); Robert Pitofsky, The Political 
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (1979). 
280
 See Manjoo, supra note 249 (discussing the battle among Apple, Facebook, Google, and Amazon for 
the future of the innovation economy); see also Research and Markets: Gang of Four (and Possibly Five) 




 See Manjoo, supra note 249 (describing how Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google are all 
expanding beyond their boundaries and encroaching into one another’s space). 
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an information giant with an unassailable position.  The AOL and Time Warner merger 
in 2000 provoked dire predictions of the rise of “new totalitarianisms” and corporate “Big 
Brother.”282  Only a decade later, AOL is almost a non-factor in the online information 
world.  Predictions about AOL’s possible monopolization of instant messaging and so 
forth expressed then seem quaint today.
283
 
¶114  Other examples of established information titans being displaced by small start-ups 
with new visions and new technologies abound in the information world.  Facebook, 
which started only in the mid-2000s (and whose founder is still in his twenties), quickly 
supplanted the then-social media goliath, MySpace,
284
 and is now widely viewed as one 
of Google’s most formidable competitors.285  Google itself started little more than a 
decade ago, at a time when Yahoo! was the dominant search company.
286
  It overtook 
Yahoo! in 2004 in the number of active U.S. users,
287
 and almost completely changed the 
way users interact with the Internet. 
¶115  Whatever the merits of the argument that “big is bad” in other contexts (such as in 
banking), creating special limiting rules for any of the so-called information monopolists 
seems unwarranted when the durability of power does not appear to be strongly 
correlated with size.  When competition for user attention online is so intense, concerns 
over possible exploitation of the public by Google or any information “monopolist” for 
that matter seem overstated. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶116  Even in an earlier era, when U.S. antitrust enforcement was much more aggressive 
than it is today, it was understood that it is not a violation of antitrust law for “any 
integrated firm, regardless of its market share,” simply to “seek the competitive 
advantages of its broad-based activity—more efficient production, greater ability to 
 
282
 Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling the Faithful to Their Knees, FAIR.ORG (Jan. 2000), 
http://www.fair.org/media-beat/000113/html; Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, ONLINE 
JOURNALISM REVIEW (Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php.  
283
 See generally Adam Thierer, A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to 
Comcast-NBC, PROGRESS ON POINT, Dec. 2, 2009, available at  
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.25-comcast-NBC-merger-madness.pdf. 
284
 As late as in 2007, MySpace was considered close to a monopoly in the social network market.  See 
Victor Keegan, Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 7, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/feb/08/business.comment.  MySpace soon lost its lead to 
Facebook; Rupert Murdoch, who had purchased MySpace for $580 million in 2005, subsequently sold it 
for only $35 million in June 2011.  See Brian Stelter, News Corporation Sells MySpace for $35 Million, 




 See Nick Wingfield, Facebook (and Microsoft) vs. Google, N.Y. TIMES TECHNOLOGY BLOG: BITS 
(May 17, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/facebook-vs-google-and-microsoft 
(“As Facebook inches toward an I.P.O., it’s Google’s turn to feel the sting of a younger competitor passing 
a key milestone that will fill its war chest and, if history repeats itself, lead to a new wave of battles over 
the Internet.”). 
286
 In 1998, Yahoo! was widely believed to have won the competition for search engine users.  See 
Stross, supra note 140.  That was the year that Google was incorporated.  Google Timeline, GOOGLE 
http://www.google.com/about/company/history (last visited April 12, 2013).  
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 See Hearing on the Power of Google, supra note 35, at 6–10 (testimony of Eric Schmidt, Executive 
Chairman, Google, Inc.). 
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develop complementary products, reduced transaction costs, and so forth.”288  In giving a 
prominent position to its own or its affiliates’ content and services in the unpaid results 
page, Google is effectively availing itself of the efficiencies derived from its engagement 
in several fields.  That, as the Second Circuit stated in Berkey Photo, “cannot by [itself] 
be considered use[] of monopoly power.”289  
¶117  In an effort to find an antitrust basis to prohibit this practice, some have invoked 
the essential facilities doctrine or the more general antitrust duty to deal.  However, these 
two principles simply do not fit in the context of search results.  Google’s absolute size 
and involvement in many segments of the information market tend to obscure the fact 
that it probably lacks monopoly power in an antitrust sense.  It is doubtful that Google 
can foreclose competition in search, let alone in the dynamic and free-form information 
market in which it faces competitors such as Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and others.  If 
the past is any guide, competitive challenge could also come from some as yet unknown 
tech visionary—a future Steve Jobs, Larry Page, Sergei Brin, or Mark Zuckerberg.   
¶118  Probably no one, not even Google, can predict how long search engines as they 
currently exist will continue.  In this environment, it would be particularly inappropriate 
to base antitrust liability on the notion that search engines are essential platforms for 
users seeking information and for firms reaching out to potential customers.  Moreover, 
the conditions for the application of both antitrust principles in the search context are 
wanting in almost every respect. 
¶119  Policy considerations also do not seem to support prohibiting search engines from 
favoring their own content.  “Search neutrality” would likely impede the natural 
evolution of search engines and constrain innovation.  While Google’s size may give one 
pause, size provides less protection from competition in the dynamic information market 
in which Google competes.  Google is no less vulnerable to market forces than Yahoo!, 
which Google displaced as the dominant search engine, or than other previous business 
giants, such as IBM.  Like these previous industry leaders, Google may one day lose its 
market position as a result of the normal workings of the marketplace if it is slow to 
appreciate changes in consumer preference or to recognize the importance of an emerging 
technology.  
¶120  The core objective of antitrust law is to enhance consumer welfare by preventing 
artificial restraints on competition.  Antitrust enforcers should be vigilant in ensuring that 
Google and other dominant firms do not affirmatively impede competition or interfere 
with the competitive process.  At the same time, it would be a mistake to limit even a 
dominant firm’s freedom to improve its product—such as through universal search 
results in the case of Google—out of well-intentioned concerns about the impact of these 
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